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Reaching Out Or Overreaching: Judicial Ethics And
Self-Represented Litigants
By Cynthia Gray*
INTRODUCTION
Since at least the 1990s, courts in the United States have risen to
the challenge posed by the increasing number of litigants who are
representing themselves in court.' Rather than ignoring the
phenomenon or simply grumbling about it, local and state
jurisdictions have developed innovative programs to make the courts
less mystifying for self-represented litigants and are continuing to be
inventive and resourceful particularly as they share their best
practices in national forums.2 Such programs include simplified
* Since October 1990, Ms. Gray has been director of the American Judicature
Society's Center for Judicial Ethics, a national clearinghouse for information about
judicial ethics and discipline. She summarizes recent cases and advisory opinions,
answers requests for information about judicial conduct, writes and edits the
Judicial Conduct Reporter, and directs the Center's day-to-day activities and
special projects. She has made numerous presentations at judicial education
programs on judicial ethics topics.
This article is an updated version of "Reaching Out or Overreaching: Judicial
Ethics and Self-Represented Litigants." The study was developed under a grant
from the State Justice Institute. Points of view herein do not necessarily represent
the official position or policies of the American Judicature Society or the State
Justice Institute. Founded in 1913, the American Judicature Society is an
independent, nonprofit organization supported by a national membership of judges,
lawyers, and other members of the public. Through research, educational
programs, and publications, the Society addresses concerns related to ethics in the
courts, judicial selection, the jury, court administration, judicial independence, and
public understanding of the justice system.
1. See Goldschmidt, Mahoney, Solomon, and Green, Meeting the Challenge of
Pro Se Litigation (AJS 1998).
2. See Effective Practices: Tested Ideas from the Field in Self-represented
Litigant Access to Justice Innovation (2005), a paper prepared for the National
Summit on the Future of Self-Represented Litigation, available at
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forms and electronic filing, public information and assistance
programs (for example, self-help web-sites and centers), training and
support materials (for example, videos and Powerpoint
presentations), community outreach and access programs, and
training of court staff. Neither the intention nor the effect of the
programs is to encourage litigants to come to court without an
attorney; the efforts are a response to a trend that is caused by factors
beyond the courts' control and that the courts cannot pretend is not
happening or will go away. Most judges have supported these
programs to improve access to justice, to prevent cases involving pro
se litigants from bogging down the system, and to prevent unfair
treatment of pro se litigants from undermining public confidence in
the courts.
Most of these programs, however, deal with self-represented
litigants outside the courtroom, and, regardless how much assistance
the programs provide, in the end, it is the trial court judge who must
figure out whether and how to depart from business as usual in
pleadings, motion practice, hearings, and other procedures when one
or both of the parties is unrepresented.
Many judges otherwise sympathetic to the plight of self-
represented litigants are reluctant to deviate from their usual
procedures out of concern they will compromise their impartiality or
make represented litigants feel they are helping the other side. One
judge wrote:
I respect the generous impulse that prompts my
siblings to grant [the plaintiff] special indulgence as a
pro se litigant .... Nor do I doubt that justice in the
case is served thereby; it is. Well and very well, for
the short run. But the run of justice according to law is
a long one, and I doubt that it is well served by
offering incentives to pro se litigation. Nor do I see
how, once the judge is cast in the role of counsel for
the pro se litigant in one respect and reversed for
failing to ascertain that role and embrace it, we can
www.selfhelpsupport.org. The best way to keep track of the innovations is to visit
the American Judicature Society pro se forum at www.ajs.org/prose/home.asp and
to subscribe to www.selfhelpsupport.org.
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easily cut steps in the slippery slope onto which we
have advanced....
. . . The role of Scrooge is one that I assume
unhappily, but once we begin to confect a general set
of rules more favorable to those who proceed without
counsel than to those who do, I know of no principled
way to stop. I would not begin. 3
In Canon 2, the code of judicial conduct requires a judge to "act
at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary" and to avoid conduct that
would make an objective, reasonable observer question the judge's
impartiality even if the judge is not actually biased.
As basic as impartiality is to the ethical standards for judges,
however, it is not the only principle in the code of judicial conduct.
Perhaps because judicial neutrality and impartiality so
often are extolled, . . . judges who have before them
pro se litigants whose pleadings or presentations are
deficient in some minor way, sometimes take an
unnecessarily strict approach, and, in the name of
strict neutrality, compromise fairness, courtesy, and
efficiency, which are also hallmarks of an honorable
judicial system required by the code of judicial
conduct. 4
Any judge who agrees that fairness, courtesy, and efficiency are
also hallmarks of an honorable judicial system - and most do -
3. Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1133 (5th Circuit 1981) (Gee, concurring
in part and dissenting in part). See also Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1156 (4th
Circuit), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978) (Hall, dissenting) ("no matter how well-
intentioned a judge may be, once he assumes the role of an 'advocate' for a pro se
litigant, he or she will lose the respect of either the pro se prisoner litigant, or the
defendants whom he has sued or both"); State v. Jackson, 141 S.W.3d 391, 392
(Missouri Court of Appeals 2004) (inability to relax standards for non-lawyers "is
not for lack of sympathy, but rather it is necessitated by the requirement of judicial
impartiality, judicial economy and fairness to all parties").
4. Indiana Advisory Opinion 1-97
(www.in.gov/judiciary/admin/judqual/opinions.html).
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should recognize that the judge's role in any case, but particularly in
a case involving one or more self-represented litigants, is more than
simply "calling balls and strikes. '' 5
The thesis of this paper is that, under the code of judicial conduct,
no reasonable question is raised about a judge's impartiality when the
judge, in an exercise of discretion, makes procedural
accommodations that will provide a diligent self-represented litigant
acting in good faith the opportunity to have his or her case fairly
heard - and, therefore, that a judge should do so. This paper
proposes that the model code of judicial conduct and the state and
federal codes of conduct be amended to make the appropriateness of
such conduct explicit.
The paper begins by discussing some of the premises underlying
this proposition, as well as some of the objections raised to granting
latitude toward self-represented litigants, and describes the
techniques recommended for cases involving self-represented
litigants. Some of these practices - treating litigants courteously,
liberally construing pleadings, liberally allowing amendments, and
asking questions to clarify evidence - cannot even be considered
accommodations for self-represented litigants; they are requirements
in all cases and for all litigants although they take on greater urgency
in cases involving self-represented litigants. Other techniques - such
as giving clear, plain English explanations for decisions and
explaining how the case will proceed - simply remove some of the
mystery from a system that is supposed to serve its citizens, not
baffle them. Even the more ambitious suggestions - relaxing some of
the rules of evidence and instructing a self-represented litigant in the
proper way to accomplish a procedural step - are logical extensions
of the principle that fundamental justice should not be sacrificed to
procedural rules, stopping far short of turning the judge into an
advocate. To suggest techniques judges may effectively and ethically
use to fairly handle litigation involving self-represented parties, this
paper includes Proposed Best Practices for Cases Involving Self-
5. John Greacen, a former court administrator and currently a consultant on
court management, reports that in talking with judges about cases involving self-
represented litigants, he has "often heard the phrase, 'The job of the judge is to call
the balls and strikes, not to throw the pitches."' Greacen, "Self-Represented
Litigants: Learning from Ten Years of Experience in Family Courts," 44 Judges'
Journal 24, 26 (ABA winter 2005).
Represented Litigants to be considered and adapted by jurisdictions
as guidance for their judges. 6
THE SAME BUT DIFFERENT
Uncertainty among trial judges about how to treat self-
represented litigants is understandable given the mixed signals sent
by appellate courts. Case after case announces "the hoary but still
vigorous rule"7 that self-represented litigants are held to the same
standard as attorneys - and then case after case, often the same cases,
describes exceptions to that rule and the special treatment trial judges
should accord to those without attorneys.
One way to reconcile these competing holdings affirms that
attorneys and self-represented litigants are held to the same standard
- courts should be lenient with both when appropriate to promote the
goal of deciding cases on the merits. The New Mexico Supreme
Court took this approach recently when it proposed a new rule
regarding unbundled legal services. The court reiterated the rule that
"in New Mexico courts, attorneys and self-represented litigants are
held to the same standards" but continued: "New Mexico courts are
lenient with both attorneys and selfrepresented litigants when deemed
appropriate so that cases may be decided on their merits."8
To illustrate, consider the following story recounted by former
Florida Chief Justice Major Harding:
A trial judge was hearing a divorce petition in which
the respondent had defaulted. The wife presented the
matter without counsel and failed to offer any
evidence bearing on the court's jurisdiction to hear the
matter. The judge told the wife that he could not grant
6. See also Albrecht, Greacen, Hough, Zorza, "Judicial Techniques for Cases
Involving Self-Represented Litigants," 41 Judges'Journal 16 (ABA winter 2003).
7. Garnet v. Blanchard, Ill Cal. Rptr. 2d 439, 447 (California 4th District
Court of Appeal 2001) (Bedsworth, dissenting).
8. New Mexico Supreme Court, "Proposed Amendments to Committee
Commentary for 16-303 NMRA," New Mexico State Bar Bulletin 15 (October 28,
2004), discussed in Greacen, "Self-Represented Litigants: Learning from Ten
Years of Experience in Family Courts," 44 Judges' Journal 24, 33 (ABA winter
2005).
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her a divorce because she had failed to establish her
entitlement to one, advising her to consult a lawyer.
The woman left the courtroom in tears. In the next
case, a lawyer for a wife in a defaulted divorce failed
to elicit any evidence of the court's jurisdiction. The
judge noted that counsel had failed to do so, and the
attorney immediately recalled the client to the stand
and asked her how long she had lived in the county.
The judge granted the requested divorce. Suddenly
aware of his double standard, the judge called his
bailiff and asked him to quickly search the courthouse
to find the woman whose case he had just dismissed.
The bailiff succeeded. The judge reopened the case on
the record, placed the woman under oath, asked how
long she had lived in the county, and, after receiving
an acceptable response, granted her divorce. 9
Trial courts possess "a discretionary range of control over parties
and proceedings" that allows reasonable accommodations to self-
represented litigants.' 0 Court have recognized that the "'proper scope
of the court's responsibility to pro se litigants is necessarily an
expression of careful exercise of judicial discretion' . . . . Each case
presents a wholly different set of circumstances which require careful
attention so as to preserve the rights of all parties."'
Thus, while stating that "rules apply to uncounseled litigants and
must be enforced," the United States Court of Appeals for the 7th
Circuit also recognized that "implementation of many procedural
rules entails exercise of discretion."' 2 The court concluded,
"discretion implies the power to say no, but when deciding whether
to grant or deny ...a motion a judge is entitled to consider all
9. Included in Albrecht, Greacen, Hough, Zorza, "Judicial Techniques for
Cases Involving Self-Represented Litigants," 41 Judges' Journal 16, 17 (ABA
winter 2003).
10. Blair v. Maynard, 324 S.E.2d 391, 396 (West Virginia 1984).
11. Id., quoting ABA Commission on Standards of Judicial Administration,
Standards Relating to Trial Courts, § 2.23 Conduct of Cases Where Litigants
Appear Without Counsel (Commentary) (1976). Accord Austin v. Ellis, 408 A.2d
784, 785 (New Hampshire 1979).
12. Members v. Paige, 140 F.3d 699, 703 (7th Circuit 1998).
circumstances, including lack of counsel, that may have contributed"
to a self-represented litigant's error. 13 A judge may abuse his or her
discretion if he or she fails to take into account a litigant's self-
represented status. 14
Of course, it would be improper for a judge to consider a party's
gender, for example, in deciding a discretionary matter. The
difference between considering a litigant's gender and considering a
litigant's pro se status is that gender does not inevitably affect a
represented party's ability to present his or her case while lack of
representation does. Thus, taking pro se status into consideration
does not indicate partiality but addresses "a categorical disparity
between the parties' abilities to obtain a just resolution to their
dispute."' 5
Because making reasonable accommodations for self-represented
litigants is a matter of discretion, inevitably, exactly what a judge
should do "cannot be fully described by specific formula"'16 by
anyone other than the judge or at any time prior to when the decision
must be made. "Each case presents a wholly different set of
circumstances which require careful attention so as to preserve the
rights of all parties."' 17 "The heavy responsibility of ensuring a fair
trial in such a situation rests directly on the trial judge. The buck
stops there. . . .Such an undertaking requires patience, skill and
understanding on the part of the trial judge with an overriding view
of a fair trial for both sides."' 18  But exercising discretion - not
calling balls and strikes - is the nature of judging, from granting
motions for extension of time to handing out sentences, and with
some guidance and support, most judges are capable of doing so with
the interests of justice in mind.
13. Id.
14. Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2nd Circuit 1983).
15. Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1369 (9th Circuit 1985) (Reinhardt,
dissenting).
16. ABA Commissions on Standards of Judicial Administration, Standards
Relating to Trial Courts, § 2.23 at 45-47 (1976), quoted by Austin v. Ellis, 408
A.2d 784, 786 (New Hampshire 1979) and Blair v. Maynard, 324 S.E.2d 391, 396
(West Virginia 1984).
17. Blair v. Maynard, 324 S.E.2d 391, 396 (West Virginia 1984).
18. Oko v. Rogers, 466 N.E.2d 658, 661 (Illinois 3rd District Appellate Court
1984).
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BASIC PRINCIPLES
Rather than being "wholly indifferent" to self-represented
litigants' lack of formal legal training,' 9 numerous decisions direct
judges to treat self-represented litigants with "understanding of the
difficulties encountered by a self-represented litigant."20  The
different treatment is variously described as providing reasonable
accommodations, 2 1 affording latitude22 or even great latitude, 23 being
lenient 24 and solicitous 25, making allowances, 26 applying less
stringent standards, 27 and giving self-represented litigants leeway
28
and every consideration.
29
Providing reasonable accommodations for self-represented
litigants is consistent with the principle that the "'rules of procedure
do not require sacrifice of the rules of fundamental justice." 30
19. Garnet v. Blanchard, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 439, 445 (California 4th District
Court of Appeal 2001).
20. Irvin v. City of Clarksville, 767 S.W.2d 649, 652 (Tennessee Court of
Appeals 1989).
21. Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 629 N.W.2d 115, 119 (Minnesota Court of
Appeals 2001); Kasson State Bank v. Haugen, 410 N.W.2d 392, 395 (Minnesota
Court of Appeals 1987); Blair v. Maynard, 324 S.E.2d 391, 396 (West Virginia
1984).
22. Liptak v. State ex rel. City of New Hope, 340 N.W.2d 366, 367 (Minnesota
Court of Appeals 1983); Black v. City of Tupelo, 853 So. 2d 1221, 1226
(Mississippi 2003); In re Mosso, 6 A.D.3d 872, 776 N.Y.S.2d 599 (New York
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, 3rd Department 2004); Conservation
Commission v. Price, 479 A.2d 187, 192 n.4 (Connecticut 1984).
23. Bitoni v. Tucker, 295 A.2d 545, 546 (Connecticut 1972).
24. Lundahl v. Quinn, 67 P.3d 1000, 1002 (Utah 2003).
25. Macriocostas v. Kovacs, 787 A.2d 64 (Connecticut Appellate Court 2001);
Borzeka v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 444, 447 n.2 (9th Circuit 1984).
26. Kelley v. Watson, 77 P.3d 691, 692 (Wyoming 2003).
27. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Madyun v. Thompson, 657
F.2d 868, 876 (7th Circuit 1981); Bates v. Jean, 745 F.2d 1146, 1150 (7th Circuit
1984); United States v. Sanchez, 88 F.3d 1243, 1247 (D.C. Circuit 1996).
28. In the Matter of Bales, 461 N.Y.S.2d 365, 367 (New York Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, 2nd Department 1983); Gomes v. Avco Corp., 964 F.2d
1330,1335-36 (4th Circuit 1991).
29. Heathman v. Hatch, 372 P.2d 990, 991 (Utah 1962).
30. United States v. Sanchez, 88 F.3d 1243, 1248 (D.C. Circuit 1996), quoting
Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557 (1941).
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The fundamental tenet that the rules of procedure
should work to do substantial justice, ...commands
that judges painstakingly strive to insure that no
person's cause or defense is defeated solely by reason
of their unfamiliarity with procedural or evidentiary
rules.... Cases should be decided on the merits, and
to that end, justice is served by reasonably
accommodating all parties, whether represented by
counsel or not. This "reasonable accommodation" is
purposed upon protecting the meaningful exercise of a
litigant's constitutional right of access to the courts.3 1
Moreover, intervening to ensure that a pro se litigant gets at least
a fair chance to present his or her case is consistent with the proper
role of a judge.
Whether a party is represented by counsel at a trial or
represents himself, the judge's role remains the same.
The judge's function at any trial is to be "the directing
and controlling mind at the trial, and not a mere
functionary to preserve order and lend ceremonial
dignity to the proceedings." 32
"A lawsuit is not a game, where the party with the cleverest lawyer
prevails regardless of the merits," 33 and the function of a trial judge
"is not that of an umpire or moderator at a town meeting." 34
Impartiality does not require passivity.35
31. Blair v. Maynard, 324 S.E.2d 391, 396 (West Virginia 1984).
32. Commonwealth v. Sapoznik, 549 N.E.2d 116, 120 n.4 (Massachusetts
Appeals Court 1990).
33. Garnet v. Blanchard, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 439, 445 (California 4th District
Court of Appeal 2001).
34. Simon v. United States, 123 F.2d 80, 83 (4th Circuit 1941).
35. See Zorza, "The Disconnect Between the Requirements of Judicial
Neutrality and Those of the Appearance of Neutrality when Parties Appear Pro Se:
Causes, Solutions, Recommendations, and Implications," 17 Georgetown Journal
of Legal Ethics 423 (2004). See also Goldschmidt, "The Pro Se Litigant's Struggle
for Access to Justice," 40 Family Court Review 36 (January 2002).
Spring 2007
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"Affording pro se litigants the procedural protection of the court
serves the interest not only of the litigants but also of the court itself'
because "courts, no less than the parties to a dispute, have an interest
in the quality of justice." 36 (Many of the persuasive arguments for
accommodating pro se litigants are found in dissenting arguments in
cases taking a more inflexible approach.)
The courts do not treat a litigant fairly when they
insist that the litigant - unaided and unable to obtain
the services of a lawyer - negotiate a thicket of legal
formalities at peril of losing his or her right to be
heard. Such a practice manifestly excludes the poor
and the unpopular, who may be unable to obtain
counsel, from access to justice.
Meaningful access requires some tolerance by courts
toward litigants unrepresented by counsel. Pro per
litigants are by no means exempt from the governing
rules of procedure. But neither should courts allow
those rules to operate as hidden, lethal traps for those
unversed in law. This may require some degree of
extra care and effort on the part of trial judges who
already labor long and hard at a mushrooming
caseload. But the alternative slams the courthouse
door in the face of those who may be in greatest need
of judicial relief, all for the sake of ease of
administration. This latter course is one which I
believe our Constitution does not permit and that we
as judges should not tolerate. 37
Public confidence in the justice system is undermined if litigants
are confronted with a system "dominated by forms and mysterious
36. Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1369 (9th Circuit 1985) (Reinhardt,
dissenting).
37. White v. Lewis, 804 P.2d 805, 815-16 (Arizona 1990) (Lankford,
dissenting).
rituals" and told "they lose because they did not know how to play
the game . "...,38
Cases that reject accommodations maintain that requiring a judge
to, for example, notify a self-represented litigant of the necessity of
responding to a motion for summary judgment would improperly
"inject" the trial court into the adversary process to help one side and
not the other.39 Contrary to that reasoning, however, explaining
procedures does not transform the judge into an advocate; a lawyer,
after all, would not only tell a client that a response to a motion needs
to be made but would actually prepare and file the response. The
reasonable accommodations do not make the judge "a player in the
adversary process" but make the adversary process function more
equitably.40
Some courts have argued that their refusal to extend any leniency
towards self-represented litigants is justified because it was the
litigant's choice to appear without counsel, suggesting, in effect, that
these litigants do not deserve any solicitude because they brought
their problems on themselves by their error in judgment in disdaining
counsel.
The hazards which beset a layman when he seeks to
represent himself are obvious. He who proceeds pro
se with full knowledge and understanding of the risks
does so with no greater rights than a litigant
represented by a lawyer, and the trial court is under no
obligation to become an "advocate" for or to assist
and guide the pro se layman through the trial thicket.4'
Trial courts generally do not intervene to save litigants
from their choice of counsel, even when the lawyer
loses the case because he fails to file opposing papers.
A litigant who chooses himself as legal representative
should be treated no differently. In both cases, the
remedy to the party injured by his representative's
38. Moore v. Price, 914 S.W.2d 318, 324 (Arkansas Court of Appeals 1996)
(Mayfield, dissenting, quoting Justice David Newbern).
39. Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1365 (9th Circuit 1985).
40. Id. at 1369-70 (Reinhardt, dissenting).
41. United States v. Pinkey, 548 F.2d 305, 311 (10th Circuit 1977).
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error is to move to reconsider or to set aside; it is not
for the trial court to inject itself into the adversary
process on behalf of one class of litigant.42
These courts identify "choice" as the element that distinguishes
pro se prisoner cases in which leniency has been mandated from suits
involving unincarcerated pro se litigants, noting that detention makes
it almost impossible for a prisoner to retain counsel and limits the
prisoner's access to legal materials.43
A more realistic approach refuses to ignore that the inability to
obtain affordable legal representation is one of the primary reasons
many pro se litigants appear without a lawyer. Thus, some courts
recognize that many litigants "have no more 'freedom of choice' as
to legal representation than do prisoners. 44  A litigant's
unrepresented status is often "not the product of choice," but "the
result of necessity and economic reality . . . .,4 Competent legal
representation is beyond the means of even many middle class
individuals, much less the indigent.46 Moreover, decades of failed
attempts to significantly increase pro bono participation and legal aid
funding demonstrate that assuming increased attorney representation
will solve the problem is a counterproductive pipedream even in the
long run.47 In the short run, individuals who cannot afford attorneys
42. Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1365 (9th Circuit 1985). See also
Bullard v. Morris, 547 So. 2d 789, 790 (Mississippi 1989) (person who elects to
proceed without an attorney "acts at his peril"); Dozier v. Ford Motor Co., 702
F.2d 1189, 1195 (D.C. Circuit 1985) (self-represented litigant cannot "avoid the
risks of failure that attend his decision to forgo expert assistance").
43. See also, e.g., Brock v. Hendershott, 840 F.2d 339, 343 (6th Circuit 1988);
Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1364- 65 (9th Circuit 1985); Waushara County
v. Graf 480 N.W.2d 16, 19 (Wisconsin 1992).
44. Timms v. Frank, 953 F.2d 281, 285 (7th Circuit 1992).
45. Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1367-68 (9th Circuit 1985) (Reinhardt,
dissenting).
46. A 2003 study in Washington state, for example, reported that only 12% of
low income people obtain the legal help they need, and the situation is hardly better
for middle income people. Task Force on Civil Equal Justice Funding of the
Washington State Supreme Court, The Washington State Civil Needs Study at
25(2003), www.courts.wa.gov/newsinfo/CivilLegalNeeds%20093003.pdf.
47. See M. Sue Talia, Engaging the Private Bar: A Path to Reducing the Need
for Self-Represented Litigation Support (2005) and Michael Hertz and Karla Gray,
A Comment on Engaging the Private Bar: Other Paths (2005), papers prepared for
but are currently involved in the litigation are subject to injustice that
simple adjustments by the court system could prevent.
Moreover, distinguishing between prisoners and other self-
represented litigants "creates two classes of indiger.t litigants, those
who are poor and law abiding, and those who are poor and not. It
then affords lesser rights and protections to the former."48 The effect
of that distinction is that convicted felons are treated more
solicitously in court than, for example, a woman seeking an order of
protection.
Although some litigants do choose to appear without an attorney
for reasons other than necessity and economic reality, 49 forbidding
latitude for all self-represented litigants because some have made the
"wrong" choice is unfair to the most vulnerable individuals in the
courtroom, those who have no choice but to proceed without counsel.
On the other hand, distinguishing between those who voluntarily
choose to proceed pro se and those who have no choice would
require an additional hearing on a party's assets and liabilities that
would further complicate and delay proceedings and require a judge
to make a decision about what a litigant's spending priorities should
be. That distinction also creates four classes of litigants with
procedures fluctuating depending on whether a party is represented, a
pro se inmate, an unincarcerated pro se litigant who has no economic
choice, and an unincarcerated pro se litigant who could afford an
attorney if he or she chose. A judge's ethical obligations do not vary
depending on whether the judge believes a litigant has made wise
choices. The emphasis on choice also suggests that judges as lawyers
may, unconsciously at least, be reflecting a resentment that
the National Summit on the Future of Self-Represented Litigation, available at
www.selfhelpsupport.org.
48. Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1367 (9th Circuit 1985) (Reinhardt,
dissenting).
49. Other factors include increased literacy rates; increased sense of
consumerism; increased sense of individualism and belief in one's own abilities;
anti-lawyer sentiment; a mistrust of the legal system; in criminal cases, a belief that
the public defender is overburdened; a belief that the court will do what is right
regardless whether the party is represented; a belief that litigation has been
simplified so that attorneys are not needed; and a trial strategy designed to gain
either sympathy or a procedural advantage over represented parties. Swank, "The
Pro Se Phenomenon," 19 Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law 373,
378-79 (2005).
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laypersons would presume to represent themselves and not pay to
hire attorneys, a consideration that is antithetical to maintaining
impartiality.
Finally, focusing on the "choice" to appear pro se ignores that
many people who appear without an attorney are not even in court by
"choice" because they are the defendant or respondent in a case or
because there is no other way to, for example, escape an abusive
marriage, resolve conflicts about children, or appeal the denial of a
workers compensation claim.
PROGRAMS
Despite the number of cases involving self-represented litigants
and the number of programs developed to deal with the phenomena,
there are very few judicial ethics advisory opinions that address such
programs. The few opinions regarding pro se litigation indicate that
judges may support such programs.
Florida Advisory Opinion 93-850 stated that a judge may assist
pro se litigants by providing them with appropriate forms. The
inquiring judge wanted to distribute a brochure entitled "Family Law
Division, Pro Se Pointers" that was drafted to assist pro se litigants in
uncontested dissolution of marriage cases. The brochure contained a
checklist of 12 required documents with explanations of the forms
and procedures necessary to obtain a final judgment. The opinion
recognized "that particularly in urban courts there is an increasingly
large number of pro se litigants seeking uncontested dissolutions of
marriage. Judges in these urban family courts need to provide
informational assistance to pro se litigants so that the judges can
promptly dispense the business of the court . . . ." The opinion
concluded that the brochure did not constitute the practice of law
because it was generic and not directed toward specific litigants or
cases. The opinion also stated that the brochure was an activity that
improves the administration of justice. In addition, five members of
the 10-member committee agreed a judge could provide an
explanation on how to complete the forms and generally how to
proceed in court.
50. www.jud6.org/LegalPractice/opinions/j udicialethicsadvisoryopinions
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Arizona Advisory Opinion 88-551 advised that judges may allow
court clerks to assist the public to fill out forms and pleadings as long
as the judges cautioned the clerks not to give substantive advice but
only clerical assistance. Clerks, the opinion noted, need to be careful
not to advise the public as to its legal rights and responsibilities or
engage in the unauthorized practice of law. The committee
concluded:
If clerks of the court were prohibited from lending
assistance to the public, the result would be a judiciary
that is only accessible to those individuals able to
afford counsel. Clearly, such an effect would not be
desirable nor constitutional. Furthermore, assistance in
filling out forms is desirable by allowing for an
efficient flow of an individual's case through the
system.
Similarly, although New York Advisory Opinion 88-3652 stated
that a judge should not assist a party to prepare pleadings, the opinion
noted that it is not "intended to prohibit non-judicial personnel from
extending appropriate assistance to pro se litigants."
Finally, Indiana Advisory Opinion 1-9753 emphasized that, at
least in a nonadversarial setting, where a pro se "litigant has failed in
some minor or technical way, or on an uncontroverted or easily
established issue, to submit every point technically required or which
would be required from an attorney, the judge violates the Code by
refusing to make any effort to help that litigant along, instead
choosing to deny the litigant's request or relief."
For example, if a pro se litigant seeking a name
change pays the required fees, submits proof of
publication, establishes the basis for the request, but
inadvertently or for lack of experience does not state
an element which the judge requires, such as that the
name change is not sought for a fraudulent purpose,
51. www.supreme.state.az.us/ethics/JudicialEthicsAdvisory-Committee.htm
52. www.nycourts.gov/ip/judicialethics/.
53. www.in.gov/judiciary/admin/judqual/opinions.html.
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the judge should make that simple inquiry during the
litigant's presentation to the court rather than simply
deny the petition on that basis alone. Neither the
interests of the court nor of the litigant are served by
rejecting the petition on the basis of this type of
deficiency. Similarly, for example, a married couple
seeking a divorce, each acting pro se, with no contest
or issues in dispute, might unknowingly omit from
their pleadings their county of residence. A judge
should make inquiry of the parties to establish this
element of their petition, and proceed appropriately,
rather than deny the petition and excuse the parties
from the courtroom on the basis of their omission.
The opinion concluded that "a judge's ethical obligation to treat
all litigants fairly obligates the judge to ensure that a pro se litigant in
a non-adversarial setting is not denied the relief sought only on the
basis of a minor or easily established deficiency in the litigant's
presentation or pleadings."
DEMEANOR
"Judicial intemperance invariably conveys the message of a
closed mind. . . . Participants will never accept that a decision
rendered by a combatant is fair."54 A judge is required to treat self-
represented litigants with the same patience, dignity, and courtesy
mandated for everyone with whom the judge deals in an official
capacity, and several judges have been sanctioned for failing to do
so. 55 "People appearing pro se and without legal training are the ones
least able to defend themselves against rude, intimidating, or
incompetent judges." 56
Judicial intemperance was found in a judge's treatment of an
unrepresented mother in a family court case beginning with his
refusal to continue a hearing to allow her to obtain counsel even
54. In re O'Dea, 622 A.2d 507, 516 (Vermont 1993).
55. Canon 3B(4), American Bar Association Model Code of Judicial Conduct
(1990). All states and the code of conduct for federal judges have a similar
provision.
56. In the Matter of Hammermaster, 985 P.2d 924, 936 (Washington 1999).
though she had appeared in court expecting the matter to be mediated
or continued. The judge cut off the mother's attempt to briefly cross-
examine the father and did not give her an opportunity to present
testimony or evidence. When the judge intimidated the parties'
daughter during questioning, she began to cry and the mother tried to
comfort her, but the judge directed the mother to "just leave her alone
and let her listen." He threatened to transfer custody of the daughter
to the father if the parties did not adhere to a visitation schedule,
although the father did not request or want custody. After the judge
directed the parties to agree to a schedule, the mother felt powerless
to object but signed with the notation that she was agreeing under
duress.
The Vermont Supreme Court explained: "We cannot let the
judiciary become an impersonal and authoritarian institution, relying
for legitimacy solely on its power. We can never tolerate, the
intemperate use of power; we must go out of our way to understand,
explain and persuade." 57 Moreover, the court emphasized that
appropriate judicial demeanor is most significant in the adjudication
of family matters.
The need for institutional acceptance and respect is
highest in family matters, where the damage that can
be inflicted by judicial rudeness and intemperance is
the greatest. At the same time, we must acknowledge
that the stresses on the judge are also heightened in
family court. It takes superhuman patience to sit
through a long day of personal conflict, exacerbated
by raw emotion and attitudes that put greater effort on
inflicting personal pain than on resolving disputes.
The essence of judicial temperament, however, is the
ability to diffuse emotional responses and facilitate
reasonable ends, voluntarily accepted, especially
where children are involved. Judicial intemperance
will only undermine the effectiveness of the decisions
that the court renders. 58
57. In re O'Dea, 622 A.2d 507, 516 (Vermont 1993).
58. Id. (public reprimand for this and other misconduct).
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In another discipline case, a judge's angry and sarcastic conduct
in the courtroom was found to have intimidated self-represented
litigants and discouraged some of them from presenting their
testimony or their positions. On several occasions, the judge had
warned pro se parties that if they "want to lose, annoy me" or "if you
annoy me, that would be a bad thing" or words to that effect. The
judge chastised, belittled, and berated several self-represented
litigants and prevented some litigants from fully presenting their case
by interrupting them without justification.5 9
Another judge agreed that, in hindsight, his comments, tone, and
manner to self-represented litigants in several cases could be
perceived as inappropriate, harsh, or rude. The judge stated that he
had not intended to humiliate the litigants but had been trying to
ensure compliance with court rules and to convey the seriousness of
the proceedings. The statement of charges had alleged that the judge
repeatedly interrupted self-represented defendants; refused to allow
them to answer his questions; and engaged in angry, disdainful,
and/or protracted dialogues with them regarding the exercise of their
rights, which was humiliating and intimidating. 60
Another judge admitted he should not have repeatedly
admonished a litigant to obtain an attorney and made negative
comments about the ability of pro se litigants.61 The judge stated that
he had been "exasperated" with the litigant because she did not
engage counsel when he thought she should and for her other
conduct.62
59. In re Eiler, Stipulation, Agreement, and Order (Washington State
Commission on Judicial Conduct February 4, 2005) (www.cjc.state.wa.us)
(reprimand; audio recording of portions of one hearing is on Commission web-
site).
60. In re Lukevich, Stipulation, Agreement, and Order (Washington State
Commission on Judicial Conduct December 1, 2000) (www.cjc.state.wa.us)
(admonishment pursuant to agreement).
61. In re O'Brien, 650 A.2d 134 (Rhode Island 1994) (censure for this and
other misconduct).
62. Id. at 137. See also Inquiry Concerning Newton, 758 So. 2d 107 (Florida
2000) (public reprimand pursuant to stipulation for, in addition to other
misconduct, telling a self-represented litigant "she'd better be prepared, because
she was not going to get by on her good looks" and responding "that is not good
enough" when the litigant stated she was trying the best she could); Inquiry
Concerning Ormsby, Decision and Order (California Commission on Judicial
The code of judicial conduct also provides in Canon 3B(6) that a
judge "shall require" patient, dignified and courteous conduct by
"lawyers, and of staff, court officials and others subject to the judge's
direction and control," which obliges a judge "to exercise reasonable
direction and control over the conduct of those persons subject to the
judge's direction and control." That provision places an affirmative
obligation on a judge both to set an example of courtesy toward self-
represented litigants for others to follow and to ensure that court staff
receive the training and supervision necessary to help them in the
often difficult task of providing patient service to self-represented
litigants. In addition, the provision requires judges to exercise their
authority in the courtroom to prevent attorneys from bullying or
misleading conduct meant to take advantage of a self-represented
litigant.
According to the Massachusetts Court of Appeals, failure to
intervene under those circumstances is an abdication of the proper
role of a judge.63 The court emphasized that it was not ruling that "a
judge must become a lawyer for an unrepresented defendant," but
instructed judges to recognize when counsel opposing a self-
represented litigant is "engaging in improper tactics and taking
advantage of the defendant's unrepresented status." 64  In those
circumstances, a judge's prompt intervention is "not to be of
assistance to the defendant, but to assert a judge's traditional role of
making sure that all the parties receive a fair trial. 65
Similarly, the Indiana Supreme Court has warned that a trial court
"cannot sit idly by" but "must be especially acute and vigilant in
governing the conduct of counsel and witnesses" and "actively direct
Performance March 20, 1996) (cjp.ca.gov) (censure pursuant to agreement for,
among other misconduct, forcing an unrepresented litigant into unnecessary
colloquy in open court regarding what he was learning in school and questioning
him in a demeaning manner that was visibly embarrassing); In re Hammermaster,
985 P.2d 924 (Washington 1999) (censure and 6-month suspension without pay
for, among other misconduct, threatening self-represented litigants who had not
paid their fines with life imprisonment and indefinite jail sentences).
63. Commonwealth v. Sapoznik, 549 N.E.2d 116, 120 n.4 (Massachusetts
Appeals Court 1990).
64. Id.
65. Id.
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the course of the trial so as to protect the ultimate purpose of that
trial. ... ,66
The Proposed Best Practices contains the following suggestions
on how to run a courteous courtroom in cases involving self-
represented litigants:
9. Start court on time (required in all cases); if delay is
unavoidable, apologize and offer a brief explanation
10. Explain to self-represented litigants that the rude conduct
displayed on television shows like Judge Judy is not
acceptable in a real courtroom, either from them or directed to
them.
11. Treat self-represented litigants with patience, dignity, and
courtesy (required toward all participants in all court
proceedings).
" Do not make comments or use a tone and manner that are
rude, intimidating, harsh, threatening, angry, sarcastic,
discouraging, belittling, humiliating, or disdainful.
" Do not interrupt self-represented litigants unless necessary
to control proceedings or prevent discourtesy.
" Do not engage in protracted dialogues or make off-hand,
negative comments regarding their pro se status.
" Address self-represented litigants with titles comparable to
those used for counsel.
• Avoid over-familiar conduct toward attorneys (for example,
using first names, sharing in-jokes, referring to other
proceedings or bar events, inviting attorneys into
chambers, chatting casually before or after court
proceedings).
12. Require court staff and attorneys to treat self-represented
litigants (and everyone else) with patience, dignity, and
courtesy.
13. Pay attention and act like you are paying attention.
* If you take notes or refer to books or information on a
computer screen during a proceeding, explain what you
are doing so the litigants understand that they have your
attention.
66. Grubbs v. State, 265 N.E.2d 40, 43-44 (Indiana 1970).
APPEARANCE OF BIAS
Another unquestioned obligation of a judge toward self-
represented litigants is to avoid creating the appearance of bias in
favor of attorneys or represented parties. Respectful demeanor
toward all participants in court proceedings is the primary method of
ensuring self-represented litigants do not experience or perceive bias,
particularly by refraining from harping on a litigant's pro se status
and by addressing selfrepresented "with titles connoting equal respect
to that afforded opposing counsel., 6
7
Moreover, conduct commissions indicate they receive many
complaints after pro se parties observe the judges in their cases
engaged with attorneys in conversations that exclude them. The
Wyoming Commission on Judicial Conduct and Ethics thought it
important to bring this matter to the attention of the judges of the
state.
Pro se litigants ... may be waiting in the hall for their
respective proceedings. It is during these times that
many judges and attorneys are seen conversing and
laughing with one another before or even after court
proceedings. Attorneys who may be personal friends
of the judge are often invited to the judge's chambers
for coffee. It is precisely this seemingly benign
behavior that makes a judge subject to the appearance
of impropriety. Citizens often view this innocent
exchange of conversation as a discussion of their case
without the benefit of knowing what is said.
The average citizen does not fully understand the legal
system and why it works the way it does. Most
citizens who appear in court are usually there on a
one-time-only basis. It is from this first and perhaps
only experience, that a citizen forms an opinion of the
judicial system - be it good or bad. That opinion can
undoubtedly have a snowball effect. Through the
public grapevine, a citizen can plant the seed for
67. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 647 N.E.2d 401, 405 (Massachusetts 1995).
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perceived favorable or unfavorable treatment by the
courts and the attorneys, thus, in turn, prompting a
barrage of complaints against judges and attorneys.
Improved localized communication may help citizens
to better understand and respect the judicial and legal
system. The experience of the Commission is that
when a citizen sees a judge and an attorney talking
outside the courtroom, a citizen is most likely to think
the worst. Thought should be given to conducting
these courthouse social conversations at other more
appropriate times and out of view of the public....
The judge and the attorney may be talking about
current events, but the citizen does not know that, and
this might be a simple way to avoid creating an
appearance of impropriety or bias.68
Similarly, the Alabama Judicial Inquiry Commission has warned
that "judges should not create an appearance that a represented party
is in a special position to influence him (Canon 2C). Calling a
represented party's attorney by his or her first name, or granting the
attorney casual access to judicial chambers, may give an improper
impression to an unrepresented opponent. ' 69
TECHNICALITIES
Taking pains to protect self-represented litigants against the
consequences of technical errors is one of the accommodations courts
68. Collins, "Are You Guilty of the Appearance of Impropriety?" 26 Wyoming
Lawyer 16 (April 2003).
69. Childers, "Conduct Challenges With the Pro Se Litigants," Alabama
Judicial Inquiry Commission Judicial Conduct Letter (summer 2004), reprinted in
Judicial Conduct Reporter (AJS spring 2005). See also Kennick v. Commission on
Judicial Performance, 787 P.2d 591 (California 1990) (finding violation of code of
judicial conduct where judge "met privately with [two] attorneys in chambers on
days when the attorneys were appearing before [him] as counsel in a case on his
calendar, thereby giving the appearance of impropriety"); In re Slusher,
Stipulation, Agreement, and Order (Washington State Commission on Judicial
Conduct April 1, 1994) (www.cjc.state.wa.us) (finding violation of code of judicial
conduct where judge engaged in a casual and cordial conversation in the courtroom
with one of the parties in a case that the other party observed).
have approved for self-represented litigants to prevent "inadvertent
forfeiture of important rights because of their lack of legal
training."7 ° "Legal technicalities must. be tempered by justice. '"71
"Once a pro se litigant has done everything possible to bring his
action, he should not be penalized by strict rules which might
otherwise apply if he were represented by counsel. 72
Thus, judges have been warned not to harshly or inflexibly apply
technical rules to self-represented litigants 73 or to sanction self-
represented litigants for "a procedural misstep here or there."
74
Instead, they have been encouraged "to overlook, in the interest of
justice and the speedy adjudication of claims, minor errors in the
adherence to court rules and procedures"' 75 and to grant self-
represented litigants leniency in technical matters and mere
formalities.76
The United States Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit, for
example, held that it was an abuse of discretion for a trial court to
dismiss a complaint that failed to include a caption, identified cause
of action, and prayer for relief where those failures did not interfere
with the defendant's ability to understand the claims or otherwise
prejudice the adverse party.77 Similarly, the United States Court of
Appeals for the 9th Circuit held that a claimant's technical non-
70. Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2nd Circuit 1983). See also Lombardi v.
Citizens National Trust & Savings Bank, 289 P.2d 823, 824 (California 2nd District
Court of Appeal 1955) (judge has duty to see that a self-represented litigant's cause
is not defeated by mere inadvertence or want of attention).
71. Rappleyea v. Campbell, 884 P.2d 126, 132 (California 1994) (Arabian,
concurring).
72. Oritz v. Cornetta, 867 F.2d 146, 148 (2nd Circuit 1989).
73. Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2nd Circuit 1983); Frankos v. LaVallee,
535 F.2d 1346, 1347 (2nd Circuit 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 918 (1976);
Martinez-McBean v. Government of Virgin Islands, 562 F.2d 908, 912 (3rd Circuit
1977).
74. Lundahl v. Quinn, 67 P.3d 1000, 1002 (Utah 2003).
75. Cassell v. Shellenberger, 514 A.2d 163, 165 (Pennsylvania Superior Court
1986), appeal denied, 529 A.2d 1078 (1987).
76. Barrett v. City of Margate, 743 So. 2d 1160, 1162 (Florida 4th District
Court of Appeal 1999); Griffin v. Unemployment Appeals Commission 868 So. 2d
1262, 1264 (Florida 4th District Court of Appeal 2004).
77. Phillips v. Girdich, 408 F.3d 124, 129-30 (2nd Circuit 2005).
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compliance with the rule regarding service of process on officers of
the United States did not mandate dismissal.78
The Proposed Best Practices contains the following suggestion
regarding technicalities in cases involving self-represented litigants:
21. Follow the principle that cases should be disposed of on the
merits, rather than with strict regard to technical rules of
procedure.
PROVIDING CLEAR EXPLANATIONS
There are several actions that judges unquestionably can take in
cases involving self-represented litigants - and, therefore, arguably
should take - without raising reasonable questions about impartiality
under the code of judicial conduct.
For example, nothing in the code of judicial conduct (or
elsewhere) requires a judge to use the jargon, abbreviations,
acronyms, shorthand, and slang that frequently mark communications
among legal professionals but inevitably leave a self-represented
litigant feeling confused and left out. Moreover, the careless use of
jargon may mislead a self-represented litigant and ultimately result
"in not only a miscarriage of justice, but the undermining of
confidence in the judicial system." 79 On the other hand, a judge's
eschewing of legalese neither gives an advantage to self-represented
litigants nor prejudices represented litigants.
Thus, a judge should take "affirmative steps" in cases involving a
self-represented litigant, "for example, spending a few minutes
editing a letter or minute order from the court - to make sure any
communication . . . is clear, understand-able, and does not require
translation into normal-speak., 80 This would include making a self-
represented litigant aware of the possible consequences of violating
an order entered by the court, for example, that violation of an order
to appear for a deposition may result in a dismissal with prejudice, 81
78. Borzeka v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 444, 447 n.2 (9th Circuit 1984).
79. Garnet v. Blanchard, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 439, 446 (California 4th District
Court of Appeal 2001).
80. Id.
81. Bobal v. Rensselaer Poytechnic Institute, 916 F.2d 759, 763 (2nd Circuit
1990), cert.denied, 499 U.S. 943 (1991).
and providing a self-represented litigant with a notice of trial that
describes the nature of proceedings in unambiguous terms.82 Taking
special care to make sure that verbal instructions and written notices
are clear and understandable by a layperson "is the essence of equal
and fair treatment," and it "is not only important to serve the ends of
justice, but to maintain public confidence in the judicial system." 83
Furthermore, "notions of simple fairness" suggest that a judge
should give an explanation for a ruling to a self-represented litigant,
if not to every litigant.84  Giving a rationale for a decision is
inherently part of the duty of a judge, and doing so in a case
involving a self-represented litigant could not reasonably be
considered evidence of partiality. That is true even if explaining the
basis for a ruling incidentally assists a self-represented litigant to
prepare an amended pleading.85 By explaining a ruling either in
writing or orally on the record, a judge avoids conveying to self-
represented litigants "the impression that their efforts to studiously
prepare their case were not worthy of comment" or that the judge is
biased towards the other side.86
Indeed, if judges undertake in every case the challenge of
explaining their actions in a way that is comprehensible to non-
lawyers, they will ensure that their orders and decisions are
understood not just by self-represented litigants but by poorly
represented litigants, inexperienced lawyers, represented litigants, the
public, and the media. Such a result cannot help but improve party
and public confidence in the justice system without any sacrifice of
impartiality or the appearance of impartiality.
82. Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983) (reversing judgment for
plaintiff where notice of trial described nature of proceedings against unrepresented
defendant in such ambiguous terms that it deprived him of adequate time to prepare
for his defense in violation of his right to due process).
83. Gamet v. Blanchard, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 439, 446 (California 4th District
Court of Appeal 2001).
84. Lucas v. Miles, 84 F.3d 532, 535 (2nd Circuit 1996).
85. Paulson v. Evander, 633 So. 2d 540, 541 (Florida 5th District Court of
Appeal, 1994).
86. Schulz v. Warren County Board of Supervisors, 581 N.Y.S.2d 885, 888
(New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, 3rd Department), leave to appeal
denied, 600 N.E.2d 633 (1992).
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The Proposed Best Practices contains the following suggestions
regarding providing clear explanations in cases involving self-
represented litigants:
17. Give the rationale for a decision either in writing or orally on
the record.
18. When announcing a decision or entering an order, do not use
legal jargon, abbreviations, acronyms, shorthand, or slang.
19. If possible, after each court appearance, provide all litigants
with clear written notice of further hearings, referrals, or other
obligations.
20. Ensure that all orders (for example, regarding discovery)
clearly explain the possible consequences of failure to
comply.
31. Ensure that the notice of hearing unambiguously describes in
a way a self-represented litigant can understand that a hearing
on the merits is being scheduled and the litigant should be
prepared with evidence and witnesses to present the case or
defense.
LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION
Judges are not simply allowed but required to liberally construe
pleadings filed by self-represented litigants. In fact, this is not a
special accommodation for self-represented litigants but simply an
application of the rule applied to all pleadings in the modem notice-
pleading practice. 87 Even less stringent standards are permissible for
self-represented litigants. 88
87. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Phillips v. Girdich, 408 F.3d
124, 129-30 (2nd Circuit 2005).
88. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10 (1980); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520, (1972); Phillips v. Girdich, 408 F.3d 124, 129-30 (2nd Circuit 2005); GJR
Investments, Inc. v. County of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1368 (1 1th Circuit 1998);
Breck v. Ulmer, 745 P.2d 66, 75 (Alaska 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1023 (1988);
Wright v. Shorten, 964 P.2d 441, 444 (Alaska 1998); Kaiser v. Sakata, 40 P.3d 800,
803 (Alaska 2002); Gilbert v. Nina Plaza Condo Association, 64 P.3d 126, 129
(Alaska 2003); Whitaker v. Whirlpool Corp., 32 S.W.3d 222, 227 (Tennessee Court
of Appeals 2000); Paehler v. Union Planters National Bank, 971 S.W.2d 393, 397
(Tennessee Court of Appeals 1998).
That injunction applies to all types of pleadings, including briefs,
but most importantly when dismissal of a complaint is considered.89
A judge should not dismiss a complaint drafted by a self-represented
litigant unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove
any set of facts that will support a claim that would entitle the
plaintiff to relief.90 The goal of liberal construction is to "credit not
so well pleaded allegations" so that a self-represented litigant's
meritorious complaint will not be lost because it is inartfully
drafted,91 to afford a self-represented litigant every reasonable
opportunity to demonstrate that he or she has a valid claim,92 and to
ensure that a self-represented litigant is not "precluded from resorting
to the courts merely for want of sophistication." 93 A judge should
construe a self-represented litigant's complaint in a way that permits
the litigant's claim to be considered within the proper legal
framework "if the essence of an allegation is discernible, even though
it is not pleaded with legal nicety," 94 affording a self-represented
litigant the benefit of any doubt.95
The liberal construction rule requires that a judge give effect to
the substance, rather than the form or terminology, of a self-
represented litigant's papers. 96 A judge should look beyond the label
that a self-represented litigant attaches to a pleading and re-
characterize it to correspond to the substance and underlying legal
basis of the claim. 97 Thus, for example, a judge should treat as an
answer a document titled "Motion to Dismiss on Plea of Res
Adjudicata" 98 or a timely letter that responds to the allegations in a
89. Garaux v. Pulley, 739 F.2d 437, 438-39 (9th Circuit 1984); Lucas v.
Department of Corrections, 66 F.3d 245 (9th Circuit 1995).
90. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10 (1980); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,
45-46 (1957).
91. Moore v. Ruth, 556 So. 2d 1059, 1062 (Mississippi 1990).
92. Satchell v. Dilworth, 745 F.2d 781, 785 (2nd Circuit 1984).
93. Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Circuit 1991).
94. Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 915 (8th Circuit 2004).
95. Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 413 (9th Circuit 1988).
96. Brown v. City of Manchester, 722 S.W.2d 394, 397 (Tennessee Court of
Appeals 1986); Usrey v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 612, 614 (Tennessee Court of Appeals
1977).
97. Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 382 (2003).
98. Usrey v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 612, 614 (Tennessee Court of Appeals 1977).
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petition and provides fair notice of the defense, 99 and may re-
characterize a habeas corpus complaint as a civil rights claim if it
names the correct defendants and seeks the correct relief. 100
In addition, liberal construction requires that a judge overlook
that a self-represented litigant's pleadings may not be "neatly parsed"
and may include "a great deal of irrelevant detail."''1 A judge should
also ignore poor syntax and sentence construction10 2 (probably
occasionally necessary even in pleadings filed by attorneys). The
duty to liberally construe a self-represented litigant's pleadings
includes a duty to consider allegations found in other documents filed
by the litigant. 103
Moreover, the liberal construction rule means that a judge should
apply the relevant law regardless whether a self-represented litigant
has mentioned it by name.' °4 Although a court cannot create a claim
or a defense for a self-represented litigant where none exists, 10 5 a
judge should interpret a self-represented litigant's papers to raise the
99. Wright v. Shorten, 964 P.2d 441, 444 (Alaska 1998). See also Kennedy v.
First Bank of Fairbanks, 637 P.2d 297, 298 (Alaska 1981) (refusal to set aside
default was abuse of discretion where self-represented debtor's prompt response to
complaint, although technically inadequate to prevent entry of default, was due to
lack of familiarity with rules and not gross neglect and the adequacy of the
creditor's case against the debtor was debatable).
100. Glaus v. Anderson, 408 F.3d 382, 388 (7th Circuit, 2005). The court
instructed judges to warn pro se litigants "of the consequences of the conversion
and provide[ ] an opportunity for the litigant to withdraw or amend his or her
complaint."
101. Phillips v. Girdich, 408 F.3d 124, 129-30 (2nd Circuit 2005).
102. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Circuit 1991).
103. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Howard v. King, 707 F.2d
215, 220 (5th Circuit 1983); Moore v. Florida, 703 F.2d 516, 521 (11th Circuit
1983); Woodall v. Foti, 648 F.2d 268, 272 (5th Circuit 1981); Wright v. El Paso
County Jail, 642 F.2d 134, 135 (5th Circuit 1981); Matzkerv. Herr, 748 F.2d 1142,
1148 n.5 (7th Circuit 1984).
104. Holley v. Department of Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 247-48 (3rd
Circuit 1999) (self-represented plaintiffs complaint should not have been
dismissed for citing wrong statutory provision); Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365,
373 (3rd Circuit 2003).
105. Rampy v. ICI Acrylics, Inc., 898 S.W.2d 196, 198 (Tennessee Court of
Appeals 1994).
strongest arguments they suggest 10 6 and to give effect to a pleading in
conformity with the general theory that it was intended to follow. 10 7
Furthermore, the liberal construction rule "means that if the court
can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the
plaintiff could prevail, it should do so despite the plaintiffs failure to
cite proper legal authority [and] his confusion of various legal
theories . ,,"08
The United States Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit has noted
that, under the federal rules of civil procedures, a plaintiff is not
required "to plead the legal theory, facts, or elements underlying his
claim."
This is especially true in the case of pro se litigants,
who cannot be expected to know all of the legal
theories on which they might ultimately recover. It is
enough that they allege that they were injured, and
that their allegations can conceivably give rise to a
viable claim. . . In [determining what claims have
been raised], the court's imagination should be limited
only by [the plaintiffs] factual allegations, not by the
legal claims set out in his pleadings. 10 9
Thus, the liberal construction rule means a judge should not
ignore any obvious possible cause of action or defense suggested by
the facts alleged in the pleadings even if the litigant does not
expressly invoke that theory. However, it does not mean a trial judge
has "to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them." 110
District judges are not mind readers. Even in the case
of pro se litigants, they cannot be expected to
construct full blown claims from sentence fragments.
106. Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2nd Circuit 1994).
107. Hill v. Williams, 813 A.2d 130, 132 (Connecticut Appellate Court 2003),
cert. denied, 222 A.2d 242 (Connecticut 2003) (giving effect to allegations
sounding in contract as well as those sounding in tort).
108. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Circuit 1991).
109. Phillips v. Girdich, 408 F.3d 124, 129-30 (2nd Circuit 2005).
110. Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1276 (4th Circuit 1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1088 (1986).
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. . . To do so would not only strain judicial resources
by requiring those courts to explore exhaustively all
potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, but would also
transform the district court from its legitimate
advisory role to the improper role of an advocate
seeking out the strongest arguments and most
successful strategies for a party."'
Moreover, the liberal construction rule does not relieve a self-
represented litigant of the responsibility of making sufficient factual
allegations to give the other side fair notice of the claim or request.'' 2
Although not every fact must be described in specific detail," 3 a self-
represented plaintiff "requires no special legal training to recount the
facts surrounding his alleged injury. ." 1"4 Thus, a judge does not
have discretion to overlook when a complaint does not allege a
sufficient factual basis to give a defendant adequate notice of the
circumstances surrounding the controversy.11 5  Moreover, a judge
should not infer, assume, or supply facts to round out a plaintiffs
complaint" l6 or accept conclusory allegations. 1 7 Further, the liberal
construction rule does not give a judge "license to . . . rewrite an
otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action." 118
Moreover, the liberal construction rule does not require or even
permit a judge to apply a more sympathetic view of the substantive
law and to relieve a selfrepresented litigant of the usual burden of
proof or standard of proof. In a fraud case, for example, if the
111. Id. at 1277-78. However, if subsequent proceedings "reveal that
ambiguous fragments in the complaint represent the heart of a litigant's concern," a
district court should consider those additional claims.
112. Commonwealth v. Miller, 416 S.W.2d 358, 360 (Kentucky 1967);
Beecham v. Commonwealth, 657 S.W.2d 234, 236 (Kentucky 1983).
113. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).
114. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Circuit 1991).
115. Cassell v. Shellenberger, 514 A.2d 163, 165 (Pennsylvania Superior
Court 1986).
116. Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 915 (8th Circuit 2004); Whitney v. State of
New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1174 (10th Circuit 1997).
117. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Circuit 1991).
118. See G JR Investments, Inc. v. County of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1368
(11 th Circuit 1998); Paulson v. Evander, 633 So. 2d 540, 541 (Florida 5th District
Court of Appeal 1994).
plaintiff did not allege or prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the defendant misrepresented a material fact during the transaction, a
judge must rule in favor of the defendant however underhanded the
judge may consider the defendant and however legitimate the self-
represented plaintiff's outrage may be.
The Proposed Best Practices contains the following suggestions
regarding liberal construction of pleadings in cases involving self-
represented litigants:
14. Construe pleadings liberally.
* Look behind the label of a document filed by a self-
represented litigant and give effect to the substance, rather
than the form or terminology.
* Do not ignore an obvious possible cause of action or
defense suggested by the facts alleged in the pleadings
even if the litigant does not expressly refer to that theory.
* Consider information in other documents filed by a self-
represented litigant.
* Allow amendment freely.
LIBERAL AMENDMENT
Self-represented litigants must be freely afforded an opportunity
to amend a complaint to add sufficient factual allegations, although,
again, this is not a special accommodation for self-represented
litigants but a requirement in all cases. 119  "The rule favoring
liberality in amendments to pleadings is particularly important for the
pro se litigant. Presumably unskilled in the law, the pro se litigant is
far more prone to making errors in pleading than the person who
benefits from the representation of counsel."' 120
A judge should not dismiss a complaint filed by a self-
represented litigant without granting leave to amend at least once
when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a
valid claim might be stated.'22 A self-represented plaintiff whose
119. Bobal v. Rensselaer Poytechnic Institute, 916 F.2d 759, 763 (2nd Circuit
1990), cert denied, 499 U.S. 943 (1991); Satchell v. Dilworth, 745 F.2d 781, 785
(2nd Circuit 1984); Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2nd Circuit 1983).
120. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Circuit 1987).
121. Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 705 (2nd Circuit 1991).
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factual allegations are "close to stating a claim but are missing some
important element that may not have occurred" to the litigant should
be allowed to amend the complaint, 22 "particularly where the
deficiencies are attributable to oversights likely the result of an
untutored pro se litigant's ignorance of special pleading
requirements."' 123  For example, dismissal should be without
prejudice and with leave to amend to give a self-represented litigant
an opportunity to attempt to allege an injury 124 or to name the proper
parties. 125
Moreover, in dismissing a complaint with leave to amend, a trial
judge has the duty to "draft a few sentences" explaining the
deficiencies in a self-represented litigant's allegations to help ensure
that the litigant can use the opportunity to amend effectively without
simply repeating previous errors.1 26  A judge must do more "than
simply advise the pro se plaintiff that his complaint needs to be
shorter and more concise,"1 27 but the "statement of deficiencies need
not provide great detail or require district courts to act as legal
advisors to pro se plaintiffs ... 128 For example, a judge is required
to point out if the dismissal of a civil rights complaint is based on the
failure to allege that the defendant acted under color of state law' 29 or
to allege receipt of a right-to-sue letter.' 30
The United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit in Noll v.
Carlson held that a trial judge abused his discretion by dismissing a
self-represented prisoner's second amended complaint without leave
to amend where his previous amendments were "without the benefit
122. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Circuit 1991).
123. Reynoldson v. Shillinger, 907 F.2d 124, 126 (10th Circuit 1990).
124. Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 352 (2nd Circuit 2003).
125. Soto v. Walker, 44 F.3d 169 (2nd Circuit 1995).
126. Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1136-37 (9th Circuit 1987). See also
Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Circuit 1987); Karim-Panahi v. Los
Angeles Police Department, 839 F.2d 621, 624 (9th Circuit 1988); Collins v. Arctic
Builders, 957 P.2d 980, 982 (Alaska 1998).
127. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Department, 839 F.2d 621, 625 (9th
Circuit 1988).
128. Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1136 (9th Circuit 1987).
129. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Circuit 1987).
130. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Department, 839 F.2d 621, 627 (9th
Circuit 1988).
of the court notifying him of any deficiencies in his previous
pleadings." 131 Stating it was not absolutely clear that the plaintiff
could not amend his complaint to allege constitutional violations, the
court noted, for example, that although his allegations that he was
placed in prison with "known enemies" were conclusory, "he may be
able to amend his complaint to allege facts showing that prison
officials acted with 'deliberate indifference' to his physical safety in
violation of the eighth amendment." 132
However, a judge is not required to give a self-represented
litigant unlimited chances to successfully amend a complaint. In
Barrett v. City of Margate,133 the Florida Court of Appeals upheld the
dismissal with prejudice of the plaintiffs' third amended complaint.
The trial judge had twice granted the self-represented plaintiffs leave
to amend a complaint that had not set forth a short and plain
statement of the ultimate facts showing entitlement to relief, contrary
to the rules of civil procedure. The trial judge had advised them to set
forth a "short concise statement of the facts" and warned them that
their action would not survive if the complaint was not
substantially edited. Finding the plaintiffs' third amended complaint
to be "manuscript in size" and contrary to the pleading standards
previously explained, the trial judge dismissed the third amended
complaint with prejudice.
The appellate court stated that "although there is no magical
number of amendments which are allowed, dismissal of a complaint
that is before the court on a third attempt at proper pleading is
generally not an abuse of discretion."' 134
It is not permissible for any litigant to submit a
disorganized assortment of allegations and argument
in hope that a legal premise will materialize on its
own. The trial court provided the [plaintiffs] with
appropriate direction and reasonable opportunities to
131. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1449 (9th Circuit 1987).
132. Id. at 1449 n.4. See also Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1136-37 (9th
Circuit 1987) (dismissal of amended complaint was abuse of discretion where
initial complaint was dismissed for failure to comply in form with local rules of
court in form without an explanation of how the complaint was deficient).
133. 743 So. 2d 1160 (Florida 4th District Court of Appeal 1999).
134. Id. at 1162
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cure the deficiencies in their pleadings. The
[plaintiffs'] convoluted, verbose, narrative style
pleading, coupled with their refusal to comply with
either the trial court's directives or the mandate of [the
rules of civil procedure] clearly demonstrates the need
for the rule and exemplifies the potential for abuse of
the judicial process when the rule is not enforced.135
The Proposed Best Practices contains the following suggestion
regarding amendment of pleadings in cases involving self-
represented litigants:
15. Give a self-represented litigant notice of any substantive
defect in a pleading and an opportunity to remedy the
defect unless it is absolutely clear that no adequate
amendment is possible.
EXPLAINING THE PROCESS
One of the recommended accommodations for cases with pro se
litigants is to explain to all parties in the case how the proceedings
will be conducted. 136 The Minnesota Proposed Protocol to Be Used
by Judicial Officers During Hearings Involving Pro Se Litigants,'
37
for example, suggests that a judge explain the process, 38 the
135. Id. at 1163.
136. See, e.g., Albrecht, Greacen, Hough, Zorza, "Judicial Techniques for
Cases Involving Self-Represented Litigants," 41 Judges' Journal 16, 45 (ABA
winter 2003).
137. See ajs.org/prose/pdfs/ProposedProtocol.pdf The protocol was proposed
by the Minnesota Conference of Chief Judges Pro Se Implementation Committee.
138. "For example, 'I will hear both sides in this matter. First I will listen to
what the Petitioner wants me to know about this case and then I will listen to what
the Respondent wants me to know about this case. I will try to give each side
enough time and opportunity to tell me their side of the case, but I must proceed in
the order I indicated. So please do not interrupt while the other party is presenting
their evidence. Everything that is said in court is written down by the court reporter
and in order to insure that the court record is accurate, only one person can talk at
the same time. Wait until the person asking a question finishes before answering
and the person asking the question should wait until the person answering the
question finishes before asking the next question."'
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elements, 39 that the party bringing the action has the burden to
present evidence in support of the relief sought, 140 the kind of
evidence that may be presented,' 4' and the kind of evidence that
cannot be considered. 142  The Minnesota Protocol then directs the
judge to "ask both parties whether they understand the process and
the procedure."
It does not raise reasonable questions about a judge's impartiality
for the judge to ensure that all the litigants, represented and
unrepresented alike, understand how the proceedings will unfold. It
may eliminate confusion on the part of a self-represented litigant that
139. "For example, in Order for Protection (OFP) cases: 'Petitioner is
requesting an Order for Protection. An Order for Protection will be issued if
Petitioner can show that she is the victim of domestic abuse. Domestic abuse means
that she has been subject to physical harm or that she was reasonably in fear of
physical harm or that she was reasonably in fear of physical harm as a result of the
conduct or statements of the Respondent. Petitioner is requesting a Harassment
Restraining Order. A Harassment Restraining Order will be issued if Petitioner can
show that she is the victim of harassment. Harassment means that she has been
subject to repeated, intrusive, or unwanted acts, words, or gestures by the
Respondent that are intended to adversely affect the safety, security, or the privacy
of the Petitioner."'
140. "For example, in OFP cases: 'Because the Petitioner has requested this
order, she has to present evidence to show that a court order is needed. I will not
consider any of the statements in the Petition that has been filed in this matter. I can
only consider evidence that is presented in court today. If Petitioner is unable to
present evidence that an order is needed, then I must dismiss this action.'
141. "Evidence can be in the form of testimony from the parties, testimony
from witnesses, or exhibits. Everyone who testifies will be placed under oath and
will be subject to questioning by the other party. All exhibits must first be given an
exhibit number by the court reporter and then must be briefly described by the
witness who is testifying and who can identify the exhibit. The exhibit is then given
to the other party who can look at the exhibit and let me know any reason why I
should not consider that exhibit when I decide the case. I will then let you know
whether the exhibit can be used as evidence."
142. "I have to make my decision based upon the evidence that is admissible
under the Rules of Evidence for courts in Minnesota. If either party starts to present
evidence that is not admissible, I may stop you and tell you that I cannot consider
that type of evidence. Some examples of inadmissible evidence are hearsay and
irrelevant evidence. Hearsay is a statement by a person who is not in court as a
witness: hearsay could be an oral statement that was overheard or a written
statement such as a letter or an affidavit. Irrelevant evidence is testimony or
exhibits that do not help me understand or decide issues that are involved in this
case."
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normally benefits a represented party, but attorneys or represented
litigants cannot argue that they have a right to a clueless opponent if
the opponent is unrepresented. Moreover, the case law demonstrates
that there can be no objection on ethical or other grounds to a judge
explaining procedures.
The Indiana Supreme Court, for example, instructed trial judges
in cases involving self-represented litigants to continually bring to
the litigant's attention "that important procedural points in the trial
have been reached," for example, when the accused should question a
prospective juror, cross examine a witness, or make opening and
closing statements. The court stated, "only by vigorously assuming
this responsibility can there be any assurance that the trial will serve
the purposes for which it is held." 143
Similarly, the Illinois Appellate Court noted that, in order for a
trial involving a self-represented litigant to proceed with fairness, a
judge "must explain matters that would normally not require
explanation and must point out rules and procedures that would
normally not require pointing out. Such an undertaking requires
patience, skill and understanding on the part of the trial judge with an
overriding view of a fair trial for both sides." 144 Courts have also held
that a judge should provide a self-represented litigant with
meaningful notice of what is expected of him or her 45 and advise a
self-represented litigant of the right to cross-examine witnesses and
to produce witnesses. 146
Descriptions in appellate cases indicate that many trial court
judges are already outlining the proceedings for self-represented
litigants with no suggested adverse effect on their impartiality. The
appellate courts speak approvingly of these efforts without censure
(although, as the efforts are discussed in the context of rejecting a
self-represented litigant's argument that even more leniency should
have been shown, there is no explicit holding that the
accommodations are required or permitted).
143. Grubbs v. State, 265 N.E.2d 40, 44 (Indiana 1970).
144. Oko v. Rogers, 466 N.E.2d 658, 661 (Illinois 3rd District Appellate Court
1984).
145. Schooley v. Kennedy, 712 F.2d 372, 373-74 (8th Circuit 1983).
146. Silvestris v. Silvestris, 265 N.Y.S.2d 173 (New York Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, 1st Department 1965).
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For example, rejecting a self-represented litigant's claim that a
trial judge's "frustration with the pro se representation prevented him
from being an impartial fact finder in this jury-waived trial," the
United States Court of Appeals for the 1st Circuit stated that the
judge treated the self-represented litigant "with respect and
compassion and bent over backwards to explain . . . the legal
principles which formed the basis for his evidentiary rulings."' 147
Similarly, the Minnesota Appellate Court noted that a trial judge had
"explained, and appellant understood, the necessity of presenting
evidence at trial," before concluding that the trial judge did not err by
finding that appellant failed to prove her claim by a preponderance of
the evidence. 148
The New Hampshire Supreme Court commended the way a judge
conducted a trial in a quiet title action and rejected the self-
represented plaintiffs charge of bias. The court noted that the trial
judge had "made a special effort to explain to the plaintiff proper
courtroom procedures in order to facilitate the plaintiff's presentation
of his case."' 149 Similarly, rejecting a pro se litigant's argument that
he was entitled to special assistance, the Alaska Supreme Court held
that the trial court had gone far enough by advising the litigant of
procedures and attempting to focus his attention on the relevant
issues at the hearing. 150
The Proposed Best Practices contains the following suggestions
for judges regarding explaining the process in cases involving self-
represented litigants:
5. Give a basic introduction to courtroom protocol, for example,
the importance of timeliness, checking in with the clerk (if
that is necessary), who sits where, directing arguments to you,
not other parties or attorneys, rising when you enter, and other
matters you consider important (attire, gum chewing, reading
while court is in session, etc.).
147. Andrews v. Bechtel Power Corp., 780 F.2d 124, 138 (1st Circuit 1985),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1172 (1986).
148. Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 629 N.W.2d 115, 120 (Minnesota Court of
Appeals 2001).
149. Austin v. Ellis, 408 A.2d 784, 785 (New Hampshire 1979).
150. Sopko v. Dowell Schlumberger, Inc., 21 P.3d 1265, 1273 (Alaska 2001).
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27. Explain the process and ground rules (e.g., that you will hear
from both sides, who goes first, everything said will be
recorded, witnesses will be sworn in, witnesses may be cross
examined, how to make an objection).
28. Explain the elements and the burden of proof.
29. Explain the kinds of evidence that can be presented and the
kinds of evidence that cannot be considered.
" Explain that you will make your decision based only on the
evidence presented.
" Encourage the parties to stipulate to uncontested facts and
the admission of as much of the documentary evidence as
possible.
INSTRUCTING SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS
In most jurisdictions that have addressed the issue, a judge has a
duty in all cases to ensure that a self-represented litigant has been
informed how to properly respond to a motion for summary
judgment. 151  If opposing counsel has not provided the necessary
notice (as required by the federal rule and rules in many states), the
failure of the judge to do so prior to entering summary judgment
ordinarily results in reversal.152 The rationale for the rule is that the
151. This rule has been applied in both prisoner and non-prisoner cases.
Hudson v. Hardy, 412 F.2d 1091 (D.C. Circuit 1968) (prisoner); Vital v. Interfaith
Medical Center, 168 F.3d 615 (2nd Circuit 1999) (not a prisoner); Ruotolo v.
Internal Revenue Service, 28 F.3d 6 (2nd Circuit 1994) (not a prisoner); Irby v.
New York City Transit Authority, 262 F.3d 412 (2nd Circuit 2001) (not a prisoner);
Graham v. Lewinski, 848 F.2d 342 (2nd Circuit 1988) (prisoner); Roseboro v.
Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Circuit 1975) (not a prisoner); Davis v. Zahradnick,
600 F.2d 458 (4th Circuit 1979) (prisoner); Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107 (5th
Circuit 1981) (not a prisoner); Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100 (7th Circuit 1982)
(prisoner); Timms v. Frank, 953 F.2d 281 (7th Circuit 1992), cert. denied, 504 U.S.
957 (1992) (not a prisoner); Breck v. Ulmer, 745 P.2d 66 (Alaska 1987), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 1023 (1988) (not a prisoner). However, not all jurisdictions
recognize the duty in cases involving non-prisoners. See Brock v. Hendershott, 840
F.2d 339 (6th Circuit 1988); Beck v. Skon, 253 F.3d 330 (8th Circuit 2001);
Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362 (9th Circuit 1986); Waushara County v. Graf,
480 N.W.2d 16 (Wisconsin 1992).
152. See, e.g., Ruotolo v. Internal Revenue Service, 28 F.3d 6 (2nd Circuit
1994); Hudson v. Hardy, 412 F.2d 1091 (D.C. Circuit 1968). See also Ford v.
Hubbard, 305 F.3d 875 (9th Circuit 2002) (district court was obligated to inform
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necessity for a response might only not be obvious to a layperson but
contrary to intuition and "it would not be realistic to impute to [a
self-represented litigant] an instinctual awareness that the purpose of
a motion for summary judgment is to head off a full-scale trial.. . so
that not submitting counter affidavits is the equivalent of not
presenting any evidence at trial."' 53
The required notice informs the litigant that the failure to respond
to the motion for summary judgment might result in entry of
judgment against him or her 54 and that, absent a response, the factual
assertions of the movant's affidavits will be taken as true. 155 The
notice also informs the litigant of the right to file opposing affidavits
or other responsive material to defeat a motion for summary
judgment 156 or to file an amended complaint. 157 The notice includes
the text of the rule' 58 and a short and plain statement in ordinary
English, 159 sufficiently clear and understandable to fairly apprise a
self-represented litigant of what is required.1 60  The notice rule,
however, does not relieve a self-represented litigant of "the burden of
establishing a genuine issue of material fact."' 16 1
The United States Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit has taken
this requirement one step further and held that a judge "has ample
pro se prisoner of his options with respect to his mixed habeas petitions, in other
words, to advise him that it would have the power to consider his stay motions only
if he opted to proceed with his exhausted claims and dismiss the unexhausted
claims).
153. Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100, 102 (7th Circuit 1982).
154. Breck v. Ulmer, 745 P.2d 66, 75 (Alaska 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
1023 (1988); Irby v. New York City Transit Authority, 262 F.3d 412, 414 (2nd
Circuit 2001); Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309, 310 (4th Circuit 1975); Lewis
v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100, 102 (7th Circuit 1982), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 957
(1992).
155. Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100, 102 (7th Circuit 1982).
156. Madyun v. Thompson, 657 F.2d 868, 877 (7th Circuit 1981); Roseboro v.
Garrison, 528 F.2d 309, 310 (4th Circuit 1975).
157. Breck v. Ulmer, 745 P.2d 66, 75 (Alaska 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
1023 (1988).
158. Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100, 102 (7th Circuit 1982).
159. Id.
160. Hudson v. Hardy, 412 F.2d 1091, 1095 (D.C. Circuit 1968).
161. Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (1 1th Circuit 1990), cert. denied,
500 U.S. 933 (1991).
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discretion" to give a self-represented litigant a meaningful
opportunity to remedy obvious defects in summary judgment
materials. 162 In Barker v. Norman, the 5th Circuit held that a trial
court abused its discretion by failing to afford a self-represented
plaintiff an opportunity to properly respond to a motion for summary
judgment where the response he did file contained specific, non-
conclusory, hearsay allegations that would have precluded summary
judgment if he had filed a properly verified affidavit by someone
with first-hand knowledge. The court noted that "such an opportunity
could well be afforded through the court's comments in the context
of a hearing in which the court receives oral argument on a summaryjudgment motion."163 Similarly, in Gordon v. Watson, the court held
that a trial judge should have given a self-represented pre-trial
detainee an opportunity to file a sworn statement before ruling on a
motion for summary judgment where his "answer to defendant's
motion for summary judgment" would have raised a genuine issue as
to the material fact if it had been sworn. 164
In a logical extension of the majority rule that a self-represented
litigant should be instructed how to respond to a motion for summary
judgment, the Alaska Supreme Court has held that a trial judge
should instruct a self-represented litigant in the proper procedures for
any action he or she is obviously attempting to accomplish in other
contexts as well. 165 The court has stated, for example, that a trial
court should have instructed a self-represented mother on the proper
procedures for intervention when a state agency moved for a decrease
in the father's child support obligation. The mother, who had a right
to intervene, had sent a letter to the trial judge specifically asking
whether she had to "make this request by a formal pleading."' 66
162. Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1129 (5th Circuit 1981).
163. Id.
164. 622 F.2d 120, 123 (5th Circuit 1980). The court noted that "although pro
se litigants are not held to the same standards of compliance with formal or
technical pleading rules applied to attorneys, we have never allowed such litigants
to oppose summary judgments by the use of unsworn materials." Interestingly, the
represented moving party had also filed papers that the court of appeals found
inadequate.
165. Breck v. Ulmer, 745 P.2d 66, 75 (Alaska 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
1023 (1988).
166. Keating v. Traynor, 833 P.2d 695 (Alaska 1992).
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Similarly, in Genaro v. Municipality of Anchorage,167 the court
applied the rule in a case in which a self-represented plaintiff clearly
wanted to withdraw admissions she was deemed to have made when
she had failed to respond to discovery requests. The court noted that
numerous statements by the plaintiff made it apparent that she was
attempting to contest the admissions. The court noted that the
plaintiff "never made an express request for help from the court on
how to undo her deemed admissions or how to rescue her case."'168
However, the court concluded:
While Genaro did not expressly move to withdraw her
admissions and did not mention [the rule allowing for
motions to withdraw or amend], we have
acknowledged that the rules of court "may be models
of clarity to one schooled in the law, [but] a pro se
litigant might not find them so." Although we
recognize that it is often difficult for a trial court to
find the correct balance between the need to remain
neutral and impartial and the need to inform pro se
litigants of the proper procedures for their attempted
actions, we conclude that in this instance it was an
abuse of discretion not to inform Genaro of "the
proper procedure for the action . . . she [was]
obviously attempting to accomplish," namely, using a
... motion to preclude summary judgment. Because
this would not require "open-ended participation by
the court [that] would be difficult to contain,"
informing Genaro of "the technical defects in [her] pro
se pleadings [would not] compromise the superior
court's impartiality." 169
In Gilbert v. Nina Plaza Condo Association, the court held that
the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing a self-represented
litigant's case for failing to comply with discovery "without
explaining basic steps she could take to comply with the pretrial
167. 76 P.3d 844 (Alaska 2003).
168. Id. at 846.
169. Id. at 846-47 (citations omitted).
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order ... and without then allowing her a reasonable opportunity to
take those steps."' 7' Both parties failed to comply with discovery,
and the self-represented litigant made several efforts to notify the
court that she was having problems and needed help and additional
time to prepare. However, the trial judge did not attempt to explain
the available procedures until he dismissed the case, stating only then
"if you didn't get discovery on a certain date, you should have filed a
motion to compel."' 17 1 The court has also explained that a trial judge
is obligated to give self-represented litigants guidance to ensure that
they understand how to correct technical or procedural flaws that
prevent them from meeting formal requirements that apply to actions
they attempt to take in the ordinary course of their cases.' 72
However:
Judicial efforts to enable unrepresented litigants to
present their cases should be limited to assistance to
the party in accomplishing the party's own strategy,
not in suggesting a different or better strategy. So long
as the judge is merely facilitating the unrepresented
litigant's presentation of his or her own case - as the
litigant has conceived it - the judge can be seen to be
giving the party "legal information" about how to do
in court what the party seeks to accomplish. The judge
would lose his or her impartiality and "become the
advocate" for the unrepresented litigant if the judge
gives "legal advice" such as tactical or strategic
recommendations for how the case should be
presented - what witnesses to call, what arguments
to make, what additional evidence to seek. 173
The Proposed Best Practices contains the following suggestions
regarding instructions to self-represented litigants:
170 170.64 P.3d 126, 129 (Alaska 2003).
171 Id.
172 Sandidge v. Alaska Professional Teaching Practices Commission (Alaska
Supreme Court October 6, 2004).
173173 Albrecht, Greacen, Hough, Zorza, "Judicial Techniques for Cases
Involving Self-Represented Litigants,"
41 Judges'Journal 16, 44 (ABA winter 2003).
22. Instruct a self-represented litigant how to accomplish a
procedural action he or she is obviously attempting or direct
them to resources that will provide instructions
Do not tell a self-represented litigant what tactic to use, but
explain how to accomplish the procedural move he or she
has chosen.
23. If a motion for summary judgment is filed, advise a self-
represented litigant that he or she has the right to file counter-
affidavits or other responsive material and that failure to
respond might result in the entry of judgment against the
litigant.
ASKING QUESTIONS
Judges indisputably have the discretion to question witnesses in
all hearings or trials, and hundreds of cases hold that such
questioning does not indicate partiality, even in jury trials in criminal
cases where the defendant claims the questioning assisted the
prosecution. That discretion is inherent in the role of the judge.
He sits to see that justice is done in the cases heard
before him; and it is his duty to see that a case on trial
is presented in such way as to be understood by the
jury, as well as by himself. He should not hesitate to
ask questions for the purpose of developing the facts;
and it is no ground of complaint that the facts so
developed may hurt or help one side or the other....
He has no interest except to see that justice is done,
and he has no more important duty than to see that the
facts are properly developed and that their bearing
upon the question at issue are clearly understood by
the jury. 174
Thus, a trial judge "should not hesitate to ask questions for purpose
of developing the facts.', 175
174. Simon v. United States, 123 F.2d 80, 83 (4th Circuit), cert. denied, 314
U.S. 694 (1941).
175. Id.
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Moreover, "the trial judge has an obligation, on his own
initiative, at proper times and in a dignified, and impartial manner, to
inject certain matters into the trial which he deems important in the
search for truth."'
176
In addition to the important right to have access to the
courts, it is equally important that the court be a fair
and impartial one, committed to the purpose of
seeking truth and doing justice, without bias or
prejudice, fear or favor. . . The judge does have a
function beyond sitting as a comparatively silent
monitor of the proceedings. In order to discharge his
responsibility of carrying out the above-stated
objective, it is within his prerogative to ask whatever
questions of witnesses as in his judgment is necessary
or desirable to clarify, explain or add to the evidence
as it relates to the disputed issues. 177
Because a judge may ask questions in jury trials in criminal cases
without raising reasonable questions about impartiality, logically, a
judge also has the discretion in cases involving self-represented
litigants to ask questions to clarify testimony, develop facts, save
time, or prevent a miscarriage of justice, particularly when the judge
is the trier-of-fact. For example, in Paulding-Putnam Co-op., Inc. v.
Kuhlman, the Ohio Appellate Court rejected a utility company's
argument that the trial judge's impartiality was "reasonably
questioned by the extent and manner in which he interrogated" the
self-represented plaintiff and his witness.
During a trial, "[t]he court may interrogate witnesses,
in an impartial manner, whether called by itself or by
a party." . . . A review of the trial transcript reveals
that the trial judge's interrogation of the witnesses in
the case was not improper and, thus, not an abuse of
discretion. . . . The trial judge merely assisted the
parties through the trial with explanations of how a
176. United States v. Pinkey, 548 F.2d 305, 308 (10th Circuit 1977).
177. State v. Mellen, 583 P.2d 46, 48 (Utah 1978).
trial was procedurally conducted. Questions asked by
the judge to the witnesses were merely to assist the
judge, as the trier of fact, in making a correct and
impartial decision. 178
Similarly, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme
Court rejected a pro se defendant's contention in a civil case that the
trial judge prejudiced his direct case by interruptions throughout the
trial. The court noted that the "purposes of these interjections
included identifying or admitting evidence, clarifying issues for ... a
pro se litigant, and instructing the jury. Such interjections were not
only beneficial to defendants, but were a legitimate exercise of the
court's discretionary power to control the case."'1 79
A judge's clarifying questions do not unfairly disadvantage the
represented party by altering the evidence but simply eliminate the
unfair advantage a represented party might gain if a self-represented
party is unable to present the facts in a way the judge or jury can
comprehend. Moreover, the answer to a judge's questions will not
inevitably assist the self-represented litigant, and a judge is also free
to ask questions that clarify the represented litigant's case if counsel
is not providing adequate representation. Commentators recommend
that "judges make clear to the parties at the beginning of the hearing
that they will ask questions - and explain why (to make sure they
have the information they need tc make a decision)" to reduce the
chances that questions will be raised about their impartiality. 180
Thus, in a matter involving a self-represented litigant, a judge
may ask questions that clarify and develop the issues to be
decided, 18 1 identify or admit evidence and clarify issues for the self-
178. 690 N.E.2d 52, 56 (Ohio 3rd District Appellate Court 1997) (citations
omitted).
179. Thaler & Thaler v. Rourke, 629 N.Y.S.2d 855, 857 (New York Supreme
Court, Appellate Division 1995).
180. Albrecht, Greacen, Hough, Zorza, "Judicial Techniques for Cases
Involving Self-Represented Litigants," 41 Judges' Journal 16, 46 (ABA winter
2003).
181. Lapeyrouse v. Barbaree, 836 So. 2d 417, 423 (Louisiana 2002).
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represented litigant, 182 clarify the litigant's own questions and
witnesses' responses to them,'8 3 and elicit material facts. 84
The discretion to ask questions is not unlimited, but it is
impossible, of course, to specify how many questions a judge may
ask before the questions become an abuse of discretion; the number
that is appropriate in a particular case will depend on how many it
takes to clarify the issue. A judge does need to take care that his or
her language, tone, and manner remain neutral during questioning so
that the judge displays no attitude towards the merits of the case or
the credibility of the witness. Because questioning is within a judge's
discretion, questioning is only likely to be considered inappropriate if
it is done in the manner of an advocate, casts aspersions or ridicule
upon a witness, or is on matters collateral or entirely relevant to the
case. 185
A judge may also use questions to fill a gap in the evidence that is
likely to result in a decision other than on the merits. 186 A judge in a
city court in New York, for example, concluded that case law and
common sense require a judge to ask unrepresented litigants
whatever questions about damages are necessary to permit a recovery
if the litigants established a cause of action at trial in a small claims
case. 87 Emphasizing that many litigants, despite instructions, do not
submit evidence of damages, the court stated:
Yet if we grant judgment dismissing the complaint or
as defense counsel suggests, to the plaintiff in the
182. Thaler & Thaler v. Rourke, 629 N.Y.S.2d 855, 857 (New York Supreme
Court, Appellate Division 1995).
183. State v. Hutch, 861 P.2d 11, 15 (Hawaii 1993).
184. Id.
185. See, e.g., McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 526 P.2d
268 (California 1974).
186. See Lombardi v. Citizens National Trust & Savings Bank, 289 P.2d 823
(California Second District Court of Appeal 1955) (judge should call to the
attention of a self-represented litigant omissions in the evidence or defects in the
pleadings that are likely to result in a decision other than on the merits); Gonzalez
v. Long, 889 F. Supp. 639 (E.D. New York 1995) (judge should recommend that
self-represented litigant familiarize himself or herself with cases that set forth the
evidentiary burden that a plaintiff must sustain to establish a primafacie case).
187. Webster v. Farmer, 514 N.Y.S.2d 165, 168 (City Court of Oswego, New
York 1987).
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amount of $1.00, can anyone rationally suggest in this
day and age that we have done "substantial justice
between the parties" when it is clear that the plaintiff
has obviously sustained damages well in excess of
$1.00? To do so at this point would not be "substantial
justice"- it would be a travesty on justice.
Yet does even one out of a hundred unrepresented
plaintiffs know enough to articulate the magic words
"the value of my property at the time it was damaged
was... "? Is Small Claims to become something akin
to the old Groucho Marx Show wherein the contestant
must say the "magic words", in order to receive their
reward? Shall we, as was done in that show, provide a
duck to descend from the ceiling to award the
unrepresented litigant his judgment if and only if he
mouths these magic words? Assuredly the duck would
not often be needed for, as with the old show, very
few contestants will know enough to say the "magic
words."
To do what is reasonably necessary to prevent obvious injustice,
the judge concluded, he "must direct the claimants' attention to those
precise questions which our case law, with which the unrepresented
litigant could not possibly be expected to be familiar, requires be
answered in order for the claimant to recover his judgment."
The Proposed Best Practices contains the following suggestions
regarding asking questions in cases involving self-represented
litigants:
34. Call breaks where necessary if a litigant is becoming
confused or tempers on either side are becoming frayed
(or your patience is running low).
35. Question any witness for clarification when the facts are
confused, undeveloped, or misleading.
* Explain at the beginning of a hearing that you will ask
questions if necessary to make sure you understand the
testimony and have the information you need to make a
decision.
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Ask the same type of questions of witnesses called by a
represented party if warranted.
* Take care that your language and tone when asking
questions does not indicate your attitude towards the
merits or the credibility of the witness.
EVIDENCE
Strict enforcement of the rules of evidence in cases involving
self-represented litigants can lead to unjust results as illustrated by
the following real life examples. 188
" A pro se plaintiff in a protection from harassment case offers the
defendant's recent jury- trial conviction for assaulting her as
proof that he harassed her. Proof of the conviction is
inadmissible because in Maine criminal assault is a
misdemeanor and, therefore, not within the hearsay exception
that permits proof of conviction for a crime "punishable by
death or imprisonment of one year or more." The defendant's
lawyer successfully objects. The plaintiff failed to bring
witnesses to support her complaint because she assumed that
the conviction would suffice. Her case is reduced to a swearing
contest between herself and the defendant.
" In a protection from abuse case, the pro se plaintiff has prepared
a statement about the incident to read because she knows that
she is too scared of the defendant to testify in front of him from
memory alone. The defendant's attorney successfully objects to
her reading the statement because it does not qualify under the
recorded recollection exception to the hearsay rule. The
plaintiff is too upset to testify without the statement, and the
case is dismissed for her failure of proof.
* In a protection from abuse hearing, the pro se plaintiff seeks to
introduce hospital records showing her injuries, treatment, and
expenses. She fails to lay a foundation for the records'
admissibility as required by the business records exception to
188. Sheldon, Murray, "Rethinking the Rules of Evidentiary Admissibility in
Non-Jury Trials," 86 Judicature 227, 229-30 (AJS March-April 2003). The
examples were drawn from one of the author's "actual experiences in Maine state
courts, in each of which a pro se litigant opposes a party represented by counsel."
Mr. Sheldon is a former judge of the Maine District Court.
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the hearsay rule. Following the defendant's lawyer's objection,
the judge rules the records inadmissible.
Used against pro se litigants, the rules of evidence do not act as
tools for discovering the truth but as "weapons that the lawyer can
use to gain an advantage that has nothing to do with the merits of the
case."
' 189
Moreover, in most cases involving self-represented litigants,
many evidentiary rules may be superfluous. The rules of evidence are
primarily designed "to prevent lay jurors from getting information
that might prejudice them against a party, or distract them from the
core issues of the case, or confuse them, or otherwise cause them to
settle on a verdict for the wrong reasons.""19 Admission of
inadmissible evidence is almost always considered harmless error
even in jury cases. Therefore, at least in cases in which the judge is
the trier-of-fact, there seems little reason to enforce the rules of
evidence as long as the evidence being presented is reliable and not
subject to privilege. Of course, to be fair, the same relaxation of the
rules should also apply to any party represented by counsel in the
case.
It has been recommended that judges "create an informal
atmosphere for the acceptance of evidence and testimony," relaxing
the formal rules of procedure and evidence in cases involving self-
represented litigants.' 91
[T]he judge can easily accomplish this by using
informal language. By stating, "I will give each of you
a chance to tell me what you think I need to know to
decide each of the issues in this case," the judge can
create an informal environment for accepting
evidence. Any party can object at this point and insist
on following the rules of evidence, but this is unlikely.
In the absence of objection, the parties can waive the
rules of evidence regarding following the traditional
189. Id. at 228.
190. Id. at 227.
191. Albrecht, Greacen, Hough, Zorza, "Judicial Techniques for Cases
Involving Self-Represented Litigants," 41 Judges' Journal 16, 46 (ABA winter
2003).
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question and answer format, establishing a foundation
for introducing documents and exhibits, qualifying an
expert, and the like.' 9
2
Courts have at least tacitly approved such procedures. The New
Hampshire Supreme Court commended the way a trial judge
conducted a non-jury trial in a quiet title action, rejecting the self-
represented plaintiff's charge of bias. The court noted that the trial
judge had "relaxed the rules of evidence and made a special effort to
explain to the plaintiff proper courtroom procedures in order to
facilitate the plaintiffs presentation of his case."1 93
In Wilkerson v. Ekelem, a dispute between a property owner and a
contractor, the Tennessee Court of Appeals rejected the property
owner's argument that the trial court's judgment resulted from "some
sort of bias against pro se litigants." The court noted that the trial
court had been "exceedingly solicitous in its treatment" of the pro se
plaintiff, overruling sound objections by the contractor's counsel,
allowing the pro se plaintiff to repeatedly ask the same question, and
reining him in "only when he strayed far, far beyond testimony and
conduct that would be tolerated in a case where a party was
represented by counsel."' 9
4
Indeed, relaxed rules have been approved even in jury cases. The
Illinois Appellate Court upheld a verdict in favor of the self-
represented surgeon-defendant in a malpractice action despite the
represented plaintiffs argument that she had been denied a fair trial
by the judge's attempt to assist the defendant in presenting his case.
The judge had "guided the defendant through parts of his own
testimony in order to avoid a long narrative on irrelevant matters"
and "carefully explain[ed] to the defendant why certain objections
were being sustained." Despite this assistance, the appellate court
held that there was no evidence that the judge had conducted the
defendant's case for him or failed to remain impartial. 195
192. Id. See also Goldschmidt, "The Pro Se Litigant's Struggle for Access to
Justice," 40 Family Court Review 36 (January 2002).
193. Austin v. Ellis, 408 A.2d 784, 785 (New Hampshire 1979).
194. Wilkerson v. Ekelem, 2004 WL 578600 (Tennessee Court of Appeals
March 24, 2004).
195. Oko v. Rogers, 466 N.E.2d 658, 660-61 (Illinois 3rd District Appellate
Court 1984).
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There is one judicial discipline case in which a judge was
criticized for using an alternative procedure in a case involving a
self-represented litigant. In Inquiry Concerning Broadman, the
California Commission on Judicial Performance publicly censured a
judge for denying due process in a civil trial in which the plaintiff
was not represented.196 After calling the case for trial, the judge had
asked the parties to tell him what the case was about. After the
plaintiff spoke, the defendant's attorney gave a version of his
opening statement, and the defendant made a statement. The judge
then alternated asking the parties questions. No one was placed under
oath. After questioning the plaintiff and the defendant, the judge
asked if either of them had anything to add. He then told them that he
was taking the case under submission and asked the defendant's
attorney to prepare a statement of decision and judgment. The judge
had not stated that he was going to follow an alternative procedure
nor that the parties could have a traditional trial if they wanted one.
Judge Broadman's conduct went further than any
accommodations advocated for cases involving self-represented
litigants. No one recommends that, to accommodate pro se litigants,
judges should proceed, like Judge Broadman did, without
explanations to or the permission of the parties or the protection of
putting parties under oath. Moreover, Judge Broadman took the steps
he did, not to facilitate presentation of evidence by a self-represented
litigant, but, according to the Commission, because he was "focused
on his vision of efficiency with little regard for the values that
underlie the usual procedures for presenting evidence and cross-
examining witnesses."
Although a judge may facilitate the presentation of evidence by a
self-represented litigant and by questioning point out gaps in the
evidence that should be filled, a judge should not engage in
independent investigations to assist a self-represented litigant gather
the evidence necessary to present the case.' 97 Such an investigation
violates the prohibition on ex parte communications, which is one of
the core provisions of the code of judicial conduct. Investigating
196. Inquiry Concerning Broadman, Decision & Order Imposing Public
Admonishment (California Commission on Judicial Performance February 26,
1999) (cjp.ca.gov).
197. But see Goldschmidt, "The Pro Se Litigant's Struggle for Access to
Justice," 40 Family Court Review 36, 51 (January 2002).
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facts, although it is something lawyers do, is not a uniquely lawyerly
skill that is taught exclusively in law school. Particularly when a
judge explains matters such as the elements that need to be proven
and what types of evidence are acceptable, diligent pro se litigants
should be just as capable of assembling the facts to prove their
damages or other elements of their case as they are of making a claim
to an insurance company or applying for a job or mortgage, the types
of activities in which most individuals routinely engage without
assistance from lawyers. Moreover, expecting a judge to conduct an
independent investigation for only one side of a case invites open-
ended involvement in the process that looks more like advocacy,
imposes an unfair burden on the judge, and creates unreasonable
expectations on the part of self-represented litigants. It then becomes
the judge's fault if the litigant is unable to produce the evidence
necessary to win the case. Once a judge is told he or she can verify
facts by telephone or make simple, factual inquires, where does a
judge faced with hundreds of cases stop?
The Proposed Best Practices contains the following suggestions
on relaxing rules of evidence and procedure in cases involving self-
represented litigants:
36. Follow the rules of evidence that go to reliability but use
discretion and overrule objections on technical matters
such as establishing a foundation for introducing
documents and exhibits, qualifying an expert, and the form of
questions or testimony.
" If you relax a rule for a self-represented party, relax it for a
represented party as well.
" Require counsel to explain objections in detail.
• If counsel objects, ask if he or she is arguing that the
evidence is unreliable.
" Explain rulings on evidence.
37. If necessary to prevent obvious injustice, allow a brief recess
or adjourn for the day (or longer) to allow a self-
represented litigant (or even a represented litigant) to
obtain additional evidence or witnesses.
SETTLEMENT
A judge may set aside a settlement in order to prevent injustice
upon a showing of good cause such as fraud. The better practice, of
course, would be to ensure that the settlement is not unjust before it is
entered. When a settlement results in an order by the court, a judge
should ensure that the settlement is not unduly one-sided before
signing it. No reasonable questions can be raised about a judge's
impartiality when the judge tries to ensure that any court order is not
memorializing and implementing an injustice. Analogies are to the
obligations to ensure that plea bargains are knowingly entered into in
criminal cases and to review the terms of settlements in class actions.
"A party's lack of representation at the time of entry into the
stipulation is a significant factor to be considered in determining
whether good cause exists to vacate the stipulation."' 198 Thus, when
presented with a settlement order for signature, a judge should
engage in an allocution designed to elicit whether the settlement is a
fair resolution. In housing court, for example, before signing a
settlement, a judge should ask questions to determine whether an
unrepresented tenant had a defense to a landlord's rent claims, made
an informed or knowing choice to proceed without counsel, had a
basic understanding about legal rights and defenses, understands the
legal consequences of the enforcement remedies provided in the
stipulation, and is aware that stipulations are supposed to be the result
of negotiations and that they are not required to sign the stipulations
as drafted by the landlords' attorneys. 199
Settlements are often beneficial to all parties in a case, both
represented and pro se, and a judge may encourage parties to discuss
settlement or to resort to mediation programs. Self-represented
litigants may not understand the benefits of settlement and mediation,
and a judge may explain to pro se plaintiffs that agreeing to accept
less than they want may facilitate their collection of something and to
pro se defendants that agreeing to pay something may allow them to
avoid onerous collection procedures. However, as in all cases, in
cases involving pro se litigants, a judge should not make "parties feel
198. 144 Woodruff Corp. v. LaCrete, 585 N.Y.S.2d 956, 958 (Civil Court, City
of Kings County, New York 1992).
199. Id.
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coerced into surrendering the right to have their controversy resolved
by the courts. 2 °0
The Proposed Best Practices contains the following suggestions
regarding settlements in cases involving self-represented litigants:
25. At a pre-trial or status conference, bring up the possibility of
settling the matter or referring it to mediation.
" Encourage, but do not try to coerce, settlement or mediation.
26. If the parties present you with an agreed order settling a case,
engage in allocution to determine whether the self-
represented litigant understands the agreement and entered
into it voluntarily.
* Explain that if an agreement is approved, it becomes an
order of the court with which both parties will be required
to comply.
" Determine that any waiver of substantive rights is knowing
and voluntary.
DILIGENT SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANT ACTING IN GOOD FAITH
A judge's ability to make reasonable accommodations for pro se
litigants does not oblige a judge to overlook a self-represented
litigant's violation of a clear order, to repeatedly excuse a self-
represented litigant's failure to comply with deadlines, or to allow a
self-represented litigant to use the process to harass the other side.20'
For example, in Newsome v. Farer,20 2 the trial judge had
dismissed with prejudice a records inspection suit against a university
after the self-represented plaintiff failed three times to attend the
production of documents that he had requested and the trial judge had
ordered. Although noting that dismissal with prejudice should be
used sparingly, the New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that the
plaintiffs "rigidity" and "obdurate position" prevented progress in
the case and justified the drastic sanction. 20 3 The court found that the
200. Commentary to Canon 3B(7), ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct
201. In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975), the United States
Supreme Court explained that "the right of self-representation is not a license to
abuse the dignity of the courtroom."
202. 708 P.2d 327 (New Mexico 1985).
203. Id. at 333.
judge's order was clear and specific and, therefore, the plaintiffs
failure to attend was willful rather than negligent or the result of
misunderstanding. The court also found that the plaintiff did not
notify the court or the university of his intention not to attend and
offered no satisfactory explanation for his conduct despite several
opportunities and a warning of the possible consequences of failing
to do so. Noting the plaintiff's "insistence that only he would dictate
the progress of this action," the court stated that a "litigant is not free
to disregard an order of the court simply because he disagrees with
it.''2°4 The court rejected the plaintiffs "disingenuous attempt to
invoke special privilege because of his pro se status."
Even though one may not be legally trained, common
sense dictates that when a party petitions the court to
enforce a right to inspect public records, and the court
responds by ordering that requested documents be
produced, the petitioner is not then free to disregard
the arrangements made to comply with the relief
ordered, simply because the court did not
affirmatively direct the petitioner to attend. Certainly
it does not require legal training or even any great
degree of intelligence to understand that documents
are not ordered to be produced in a vacuum.
Production necessarily implies inspection. [The
plaintiff's] pro se status does not require us or the trial
court to assume he must be led by the hand through
every step of the proceeding he initiated.2 °5
Similarly, although acknowledging that the trial judge had a duty
to recognize the defendants' self-represented status and treat them
accordingly, the United States Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit, in
Downs v. Westphal, held that a default judgment foreclosing the
defendants' interest in some land was warranted as a sanction for
204. Id. at 331.
205. Id. at 333. See also Bobal v. Rensselaer Poytechnic Institute, 916 F.2d
759, 763 (2nd Circuit 1990) (dismissal for failure to attend deposition was not
abuse of discretion where self-represented litigant received adequate warning of
consequences of non-compliance).
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violations of discovery rules and court orders. 20 6 Noting that the case
was the result of a "long, drawn-out family feud," the court stated
that "being a pro se litigant does not give a party unbridled license to
disregard clearly communicated court orders ... [or] give the pro se
litigant the discretion to choose which of the court's rules and orders
it will follow, and which it will willfully disregard., 217
The [defendants] did not disobey court orders because
of innocent misunderstanding or lack of familiarity
with the law. Their communications with the court
make clear that they understood those orders and
chose to defy them. The district court more than
fulfilled its duty to [defendants] as pro se litigants.
The court warned them that more severe sanctions
would be forthcoming, even though the "district court
is not required to fire a warning shot" before it
defaults an offending party. The court explained that
its previous efforts to force the [defendants] to comply
had failed, and that there was "no reason to believe
that further orders would be obeyed." The
[defendants] were given numerous opportunities to
correct their sanctionable conduct and comply with
discovery rules and court orders.20 8
The court concluded that the trial judge had "demonstrated
remarkable patience in dealing with this troupe of unruly litigants
[who] . . . worked overtime to try that patience, and they went too
far."209
Stating that "pro se litigants should not be precluded from
resorting to the courts merely for want of sophistication," the United
States Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit nevertheless upheld a trial
judge's dismissal of a prisoner's civil rights suit for want of
prosecution. 210  The district court had twice granted motions for
206. 78 F.3d 1252, 1257 (7th Circuit), opinion amended on denial of
rehearing, 87 F.3d 202 (1996).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Circuit 1991).
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extensions of the discovery and motion cut-offs, but denied a motion
for a third extension. In addition, the plaintiff did not submit a
required pretrial statement although the defendant did.
On appeal, the 6th Circuit found "no persuasive reason has been
posited why [the plaintiff] should be accorded special consideration
under the circumstances of this case." 211
His action was not dismissed as the result of inartful
pleading or any lack of legal training, but rather
because he failed to adhere to readily comprehended
court deadlines of which he was well-aware. That he
comprehended their significance is evidenced by his
having sought their extension. The district court was
generous in granting extensions which [the plaintiff]
failed to utilize. Furthermore, there has been no
demonstration that his incarceration was responsible
for any inability to proceed in a timely fashion. 212
In Coffland v. Coffland,213 the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed a
trial judge's order sanctioning the husband in a divorce action for his
failure to comply with a discovery order. (The sanction precluded
him from proving the existence of several promissory notes that he
claimed were marital debts.) The husband contended that his failure
to comply could be explained by his pro se status and the demands of
running a Subway franchise and teaching survival classes. The
Supreme Court acknowledged that a trial judge has an obligation to
"inform a pro se litigant of the proper procedure for the action he or
she is obviously attempting to accomplish." However, the court noted
that the husband had made no effort to cooperate with the trial judge
or to request assistance in complying with its orders and that the
pretrial order put him on notice that a failure to cooperate in
discovery could result in sanctions.214 The court concluded that "a
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. 4 P.3d 317 (Alaska 2000).
214. Id. at 321.
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pro se litigant must make some attempt to comply with the court's
procedures before receiving the benefit of the court's leniency."
215
In other cases as well, the Alaska Supreme Court has announced
that absent a "good faith attempt to comply with judicial procedures
and to acquire general familiarity with and attempt to comply with
the rules of procedure," a self-represented litigant "may be denied the
leniency otherwise afforded pro se litigants," at least when the pro se
litigant initiated the action.216
THE MINIMUM
At a minimum, judges are required to give self-represented
litigants fair and equal treatment 217 and are prohibited from placing
self-represented litigants at a disadvantage other than whatever
disadvantage arises from proceeding without the assistance of
counsel. 218 Unfortunately, there are many judicial discipline cases
that indicate some judges have used the absence of an attorney to
take advantage of self-represented litigants in blatantly unfair
proceedings.
For example, in In the Matter of Walsh,219 the judge established
two special procedures for unrepresented litigants in criminal cases.
In one procedure, the judge required defendants who requested jury
trials to appear and answer a "jury trial roll call" once a week, even
when no jury trials were scheduled, until their case was disposed of
or they got an attorney. Some defendants had to travel long distances
and be absent from their jobs to attend the weekly roll calls. At least
three defendants who did not appear were tried and convicted in their
absence.
The judge maintained that the purpose of the roll calls was to
"keep track" of defendants, noting that, while awaiting roll call,
many defendants determined that the judge was fair and withdrew
215. Id.
216. Kaiser v. Sakata, 40 P.3d 800, 803 (Alaska 2002). See also Lawson v.
Helmer, 77 P.3d 724 (Alaska 2003) (self-represented litigant waived issue of
attorney fees award where he presented no argument at all in support of his claim).
217. Dozier v. Ford Motor Co., 702 F.2d 1189, 1194 (D.C. Circuit 1983).
218. Johnson v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 630 P.2d 514, 517
(Wyoming), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1118 (1981).
219. 587 S.E.2d 356 (South Carolina 2003).
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their request for a jury trial. During the disciplinary proceedings, the
judge recognized that the procedure deterred persons from exercising
their right to a jury trial and that it was inappropriate to treat
defendants without attorneys different from those with attorneys. 220
In the second procedure, prior to a jury trial, unrepresented
defendants were served with subpoenas requiring that they attend
pre-trial conferences to enter into plea discussions with the
prosecutor. The court noted that the judge came to recognize that this
arrangement suggested a bias toward the state. 221
Pursuant to the judge's agreement, the California Commission on
Judicial Performance publicly admonished a judge for nine incidents
in which he failed to respect the rights of unrepresented
individuals.222
1. The judge did not allow an unrepresented defendant to cross-
examine the police officer in a trial on a speeding ticket,
resulting in reversal of the conviction.
2. The judge insisted that a defendant charged with driving a
vehicle with an expired registration sell his car.
3. When a defendant requested an extension of time to complete
community service, the judge sentenced her to 44 days in the
county jail without informing her that he was conducting a
violation of probation hearing or otherwise advising her of
her rights.
4. The judge found a juror who was late in contempt and
remanded him without citing him for contempt or otherwise
informing him that he was conducting a contempt
hearing.
5. The judge sentenced one defendant in the absence of a plea or
conviction.
6. After a defendant asked for an attorney in a misdemeanor
case, the judge suggested to the defendant that "(a) you use
that tax return money to get an attorney; and (b) that you go
out and find a job right away, okay?"
220. Id. at 358.
221. Id. at 360.
222. Inquiring Concerning Henne, Decision and Order Imposing Public
Censure (California Commission on Judicial Performance October 13, 1999)
(cip.ca.gov).
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7. At a probation revocation hearing, the judge added 30 days to
an unrepresented defendant's jail sentence without advising
him that he had the constitutional right to an attorney and a
hearing.
8. At a probation revocation hearing, the judge reinstated and
modified the terms of an unrepresented defendant's probation
by imposing community service hours in lieu of a fine
without advising her of her constitutional rights regarding
revocation of probation.
9. During a preliminary hearing in a rape case, after the alleged
victim testified that she had given the police information that
was not true, the judge ordered that she be taken into custody.
When the district attorney noted several times that no charges
were pending against the victim, the judge stated that she had
admitted a crime in court. Approximately 10 minutes later,
the judge released the victim upon the condition that she not
leave the courthouse. After the preliminary hearing and a
lunch recess, the judge had the alleged victim brought into the
courtroom and told her that he was ordering a transcript to be
prepared for the district attorneys' office to review to possibly
file criminal charges. The judge stated that he was going to
order the alleged victim to return to court, then withdrew the
order at the deputy district attorney's request. He then told the
victim she was free to leave.
The Florida Supreme Court sanctioned a judge who had required
employees of a domestic abuse shelter to submit affidavits swearing
that they had not furnished any assistance to pro se petitioners with
domestic violence complaints, which chilled the willingness of
victims and staff to come forward with legitimate claims and limited
the rights of the petitioners. 223
223. Inquiry Concerning Shea, 759 So. 2d 631, 632-33 (Florida), cert. denied,
531 U.S. 826 (2000) (removal for this and other misconduct). See also In the
Matter of Meacham, Determination (New York State Commission on Judicial
Conduct October 28, 1993) (www.scjc.state.ny.us) (censure for, among other
misconduct, accepting a guilty plea immediately after arraignment from a 16-year-
old unrepresented defendant whose mental stability the judge questioned, refusing
to set bail as required by law, and denying repeated requests to allow the defendant
to withdraw the plea and go to trial, even though the prosecutor consented); Inquiry
Concerning Graham, 620 So. 2d 1273 (Florida 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1163
Abuses of authority in civil cases involving self-represented
litigants have also been condemned by judicial discipline authorities.
For example, the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct
found that a non-lawyer judge's handling of a small claims case filed
by an unrepresented plaintiff "was fraught with errors as to basic
procedures and conveyed the appearance that he prejudged the case
based upon inappropriate, ex parte contacts. 224 Among other errors,
on the scheduled trial date, the judge failed to administer an oath to
the self-represented plaintiff before hearing his testimony about the
substance of his claim. When the plaintiff objected that no one was
present on behalf of the defendant, the judge read him a
memorandum from the village attorney without providing a copy. At
the conclusion of the proceeding, the judge told the plaintiff that he
(1994) (removal for, among other misconduct, ordering an unrepresented defendant
charged with misdemeanor possession of marijuana to assist the county sheriff in
"two buys and two sells" of drugs as a condition of his sentence and ordering an
unrepresented defendant charged with misdemeanor possession of marijuana to
"assist the State Attorney's Office in catching a drug dealer" as a condition of his
sentence); In the Matter of Winegard, Determination (New York State Commission
on Judicial Conduct September 26, 1991) (www.scjc.state.ny.us) (removal for,
among other misconduct, coercing guilty pleas in two cases involving an
unrepresented, 19-year-old defendant); In the Matter of the Rock, Determination
(New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct June 27, 2001)
(www.scjc.state.ny.us) (censure pursuant to an agreement for, among other
misconduct, repeatedly violating the rights of two unrepresented 16-year old
defendants); In the Matter of Hise, Determination (New York State Commission on
Judicial Conduct May 17, 2002) (www.scjc.state.ny.us) (admonition pursuant to
agreement for convicting an unrepresented defendant and imposing a jail sentence
after the defendant had pleaded not guilty, without a trial, relying on the
defendant's incriminating statements at arraignment, and without the defendant
changing his plea to guilty or waiving his right to a trial); In the Matter of Smith,
Determination (New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct June 16, 1994)
(www.scjc.state.ny.us) (censure, for among other misconduct, violating the
fundamental rights of a defendant in a criminal case).
224. In the Matter of Gori, Determination (New York State Commission on
Judicial Conduct March 29, 2001) (www.scjc.state.ny.us). Gary Betters filed a
small claims court action against the Village of Malone, seeking $1,588.60 in back
wages for his previous employment as co-director of the Malone Memorial
Recreation Park. The village attorney served a motion to dismiss Betters' claim on
the basis that the appropriate defendant was the Malone Recreation Commission
and then telephoned the judge to ask about the status of his motion. The judge had
ex parte conversations with the attorney for the village, the village treasurer, and
the village budget officer.
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could submit additional information in support of his claim before
March 19, 1999. The plaintiff agreed to furnish the additional
material by March 15, but on March 14, the judge sent his decision to
the village attorney dismissing the claim, and on March 15, sent a
similar decision to the plaintiff.
The New York Commission also concluded that a second judge
(himself a non-lawyer) failed to comply with the law by signing a
judgment on a landlord's petition for eviction and back rent without
holding a hearing on the contested issues or according the pro se
tenants full opportunity to be heard.225 After a discussion at the
bench, in which the tenants agreed to leave the premises but argued
that the past due rents should be abated due to inadequate heat, the
judge signed a judgment awarding the landlord possession and back
rent in the full amount of the claim without according the tenants an
opportunity to be heard on the issue of abatement.
The New York Commission found that another judge's handling
of a case repeatedly violated a third-party defendant's rights,
constituted an abuse of his judicial power, and suggested that he was
biased against the unrepresented litigant.226 The judge had granted a
default judgment against the third-party defendant, Ronald Loeber, a
self-represented litigant, and ordered him to execute a deed to real
property even though his time to answer the third-party complaint
had not expired and he was not in default, he had appeared in court
and expressed in writing and orally his intention to defend the action
on the merits, and as the third party defendant, he would be held
liable only if the defendant were ultimately found liable on the claim,
and no such finding had been made. The judge found Loeber in
contempt for refusing to sign and sentenced him to six months in jail.
At sentencing, Loeber objected to the terms of the corrective deed but
was not able to enunciate his position to the judge's satisfaction. The
judge did not explain how Loeber could purge himself of the
contempt, which was required by statute. Loeber remained in the
county jail for 45 days until another court acted on an application
brought by his newly retained attorney.
225. In the Matter of Williams, Determination (New York State Commission
on Judicial Conduct November 19, 2001) (www.scjc.state.ny.us).
226. In the Matter of Teresi, Determination (New York State Commission on
Judicial Conduct February 8, 2001) (www.scjc.state.ny.us).
An Ohio judge was sanctioned for implementing an improper
procedure in debt collection cases in small claims court that reflected
"a predisposition in favor of plaintiff-creditors." 227 (The procedure
was not confined to cases with self-represented defendants but
presumably had a substantial effect on those without lawyers.) Under
the procedure, the action to collect a small-claims judgment was
taken upon the court's initiative, not upon the request of the judgment
creditor, and circumvented the protections afforded by law to small
claims court judgment debtors by making freedom from incarceration
dependent upon payment in full of a small claims judgment. The
Ohio Supreme Court stated, "a judge may not blatantly disregard
procedural rules simply to accomplish what he or she may
unilaterally consider to be a speedier or more efficient administration
of justice."
CONCLUSION
Judges' allegiance to the concept of impartiality is laudatory and
indeed required. Refusing to change anything in cases involving self-
represented litigants is obviously the easiest way to ensure that
judicial impartiality is not questioned, and judges' hesitance to
deviate from the procedures is understandable. Moreover, judges
cannot eliminate the inherent advantage to a represented party of
having (with luck) an articulate, knowledgeable, skillful, and diligent
advocate. They are not so prescient and powerful that they can ensure
the correct outcome in every case. To ask or expect them to level the
playing field in cases involving self-represented litigants is not
reasonable.
Judges can, however, by reasonable accommodations moderate
the tilt of the playing field a little less against pro se litigants, remove
hidden, lethal traps, and clearly explain the rules of the game. They
can eliminate any unfair advantage a represented litigant has over a
self-represented litigant and by vigilance ensure a fair chance. The
case law indicates that many judges are already doing so without
significant concerns being raised about their impartiality. Certain
types of conduct toward pro se litigants are unquestionably
prohibited (disrespectful demeanor, for example), some are
227. Disciplinary Counsel v. Medley, 819 N.E.2d 273, 280 (Ohio 2004).
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unquestionably required (liberal construction of complaints, for
example), some accommodations are unquestionably allowed (plain
English explanations, for example), and other accommodations
reasonably follow from these principles.
The concept of impartiality is not so inflexible and divorced from
a sense of fair play that it precludes judges from taking such steps.
Only reasonable questions about a judge's impartiality are relevant
under the code of judicial conduct, and it cannot reasonably be said
that impartiality requires a judge (indeed an entire court system) to
stand by and watch helplessly while self-represented litigants
flounder when simple procedural accommodations would at least
enable them to be heard on the merits with evidence presented in a
comprehensible fashion.
The adversary system is not ensconced in the code of judicial
conduct, nor is the primary purpose of the code to protect the
formalities of the adversary system. While judges may be more
comfortable in the role reflected in the rare situation in which all
parties are represented by competent, diligent counsel, their
discomfort in a more involved role does not necessarily suggest the
role reflects partiality, and the traditional role of the judge is in fact
as a guiding force at a trial, not just a ceremonial presence or silent
monitor presiding over rituals understandable only by the initiated.
Reasonable procedural accommodations for self-represented
litigants do not unfairly disadvantage their represented opponents.
Such leniency does not change the facts, the law, or the burden of
proof or ensure a victory for the unrepresented. Requiring
represented litigants to try cases on the merits rather than spring
technical traps cannot be considered as affording self-represented
litigants an unfair advantage. At most, it gives both represented and
self-represented litigants a fair opportunity to tell their stories. In fact,
the reasonable accommodations suggested by case law and
commentators may also benefit represented parties by simplifying
procedures, and a judge has the discretion to extend the
accommodations to represented parties if an attorney is failing to
provide adequate representation. A remedy is needed for the
confusion about how much flexibility the concept of impartiality
allows a judge to facilitate understandable, fair procedures in cases
involving self-represented litigants. One change would be to amend
the code of judicial conduct. The revised model code of judicial
conduct adopted by the American Bar Association House of
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Delegates in 2007 contains a new comment to Rule 2.2 that addresses
the issue of self-represented litigants.z28 The rule provides that "a
judge shall uphold and apply the law, and shall perform all duties of
judicial office fairly and impartially." The new comment 4 states:
"It is not a violation of this Rule for a judge to make reasonable
accommodations to ensure pro se litigants the opportunity to have
their matters fairly heard." Others proposed similar additions on the
topic. The American Judicature Society, for example, proposed a
new comment:
A judge may make procedural accommodations to
provide diligent pro se litigants the opportunity to
have their cases fully heard, and such an exercise of
judicial discretion does not raise a reasonable question
about the judge's impartiality. Reasonable
accommodations include liberally construing
pleadings, explaining the basis for a ruling, refraining
from using legal jargon, questioning witnesses for
clarification, freely allowing amendment of pleadings,
and explaining general matters such as the burden of
proof and what types of evidence may and may not be
presented.
In addition, proposed additions on the subject were recommended
by Chief Justice Karla Gray of the Montana Supreme Court and
Richard Zorza, a consultant to the courts on issues related to pro se
litigants.229
Moreover, it would assist trial judges if jurisdictions would adopt
best practices to provide guidance for conducting cases involving
self-represented litigants. The more routine these practices become,
in all cases involving self-represented litigants and indeed most cases
involving individual litigants regardless whether represented, the
more likely they will be accepted and the less likely they might be
228. See http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/approvedMCJC.html.
229. Comments available at
http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/resources/comm-rulesray-090905_ddt.pdf
and
http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/resources/commruleszorza_070804.pdf.
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construed as evidence of partiality. Proposed best practices for cases
involving self-represented litigants follow.
Proposed Best Practices for Cases Involving Self-
Represented Litigants230
These practices are helpful, and many are required, in all cases, not
just those involving self-represented litigants.
GENERAL
1. When a litigant appears without an attorney, verify that the
litigant understands that he or she is entitled to be represented
by an attorney; give information on pro bono or lawyer
referral resources. Explain that self-representation is difficult,
you as judge cannot act as an advocate for either side, and the
other party's attorney will not provide assistance or advice.
" If an unrepresented litigant appears to be mentally disabled,
take additional steps to involve counsel and other support
services.
• The difficulty of self-representation should be emphasized
in cases that are particularly complex, cases where the
stakes are very high, and jury cases.
* Once it is clear a litigant does not intend to get an attorney,
do not harp on pro se status or make negative comments
that suggest prejudgment or disapproval.
230 The ideas in these best practices are based on the accompanying paper
Reaching Out or Overreaching: Judicial Ethics and the Self-Represented Litigant;
on the "Proposed Protocol to Be Used by Judicial Officers During Hearings
Involving Pro Se Litigants" from the Pro Se Implementation Committee of the
Minnesota Conference of Chief Judges; on the November 2004 draft of "Judicial
Guidelines for Hearings Involving Self-Represented Litigants" proposed by the
Subcommittee on Judicial Guidelines of the Massachusetts Supreme Court Steering
Committee on Self-Represented Litigants;" on "Judicial Techniques for Cases
Involving Self-Represented Litigants" by Rebecca Albrecht, John Greacen, Bonnie
Hough, and Richard Zorza, published in the winter 2003 Judges' Journal; and on
"Self-Represented Litigants: Learning from Ten Years of Experience in Family
Courts" by John Greacen, published in the winter 2005 Judges'Journal.
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2. Direct the litigant to the resources available for self-
represented litigants.
" Inform a self-represented litigant that he or she has the
responsibility to become familiar with and attempt to
comply with the rules of procedure.
* Repeat information regarding resources at every stage in the
process.
3. Be generous in granting extensions of time to self-represented
litigants (and others) to prepare for a hearing, obtain counsel,
or comply with other requirements as long as the litigant
appears to be acting in good faith, making an effort, and
giving notice to the other side.
4. Ensure that court interpreters are available for all court
proceedings (including settlement discussions) involving self-
represented litigants (and others) who have language barriers.
5. Give a basic introduction to courtroom protocol, for example,
the importance of timeliness, checking in with the clerk (if
that is necessary), who sits where, directing argument to you,
not other parties or attorneys, rising when you enter, and other
matters you consider important (attire, gum chewing, reading
while court is in session, etc.).
6. Explain the prohibition on ex parte communications (you
cannot talk to one side without the other side being present
and litigants cannot file any papers with the court that are not
served on the other side).
7. Actively manage and schedule cases involving self-
represented litigants.
8. Insofar as possible, monitor counsel to ensure that a self-
represented litigant is not being misled.
A COURTEOUS COURTROOM
9. Start court on time (required in all cases); if delay is
unavoidable, apologize and offer a brief explanation.
10. Explain to self-represented litigants that the rude conduct
displayed on television shows like Judge Judy is not
acceptable in a real courtroom, either from them or directed to
them.
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11. Treat self-represented litigants with patience, dignity, and
courtesy (required toward all participants in all court
proceedings).
• Do not make comments or use a tone and manner that are
rude, intimidating, harsh, threatening, angry, sarcastic,
discouraging, belittling, humiliating, or disdainful.
" Do not interrupt self-represented litigants unless necessary
to control proceedings or prevent discourtesy.
" Do not engage in protracted dialogues or make off-hand,
negative comments regarding their pro se status.
• Address self-represented litigants with titles comparable to
those used for counsel.
* Avoid over-familiar conduct toward attorneys (for example,
using first names, sharing in-jokes, referring to other
proceedings or bar events, inviting attorneys into
chambers, chatting casually before or after court
proceedings).
12. Require court staff and attorneys to treat self-represented
litigants (and everyone else) with patience, dignity, and
courtesy.
13. Pay attention and act like you are paying attention.
• If you take notes or refer to books or information on a
computer screen during a proceeding, explain what you are
doing so the litigants understand that they have your
attention.
PLEADINGS
14. Construe pleadings liberally.
• Look behind the label of a document filed by a self-
represented litigant and give effect to the substance, rather
than the form or terminology.
* Do not ignore an obvious possible cause of action or
defense suggested by the facts alleged in the pleadings
even if the litigant does not expressly refer to that theory.
• Consider information in other documents filed by a self-
represented litigant.
* Allow amendment freely.
15. Give a self-represented litigant notice of any substantive
defect in a pleadingand an opportunity to remedy the defect
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unless it is absolutely clear that no adequate amendment is
possible.
16. Read all relevant materials and announce that you have done
so before making a ruling.
17. Give the rationale for a decision either in writing or orally on
the record.
18. When announcing a decision or entering an order, do not use
legal jargon, abbreviations, acronyms, shorthand, or slang.
19. If possible, after each court appearance, provide all litigants
with clear written notice of further hearings, referrals, or other
obligations.
20. Ensure that all orders (for example, regarding discovery)
clearly explain the possible consequences of failure to
comply.
21. Follow the principle that cases should be disposed of on the
merits, rather than with strict regard to technical rules of
procedure.
22. Instruct a self-represented litigant how to accomplish a
procedural action he or she is obviously attempting or direct
them to resources that will provide such instructions.
Do not tell a self-represented litigant what tactic to use, but
explain how to accomplish the procedure he or she has
chosen.
23. If a motion for summary judgment is filed, advise a self-
represented litigant that he or she has the right to file counter-
affidavits or other responsive material and that failure to
respond might result in the entry of judgment against the
litigant.
24. Decide all motions filed by a self-represented litigant without
undue delay.
SETTLEMENT
25. At a pre-trial or status conference, bring up the possibility of
settling the matter or referring it to mediation.
Encourage, but do not try to coerce, settlement or
mediation.
26. If the parties present you with an agreed order settling a case,
engage in allocution to determine whether the self-
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represented litigant understands the agreement and entered
into it voluntarily.
" Explain that if an agreement is approved, it becomes an
order of the court with which both parties will be required
to comply.
• Determine that any waiver of substantive rights is knowing
and voluntary.
PRE-HEARING
27. Explain the process and ground rules (e.g., that you will hear
from both sides, who goes first, everything said will be
recorded, witnesses will be sworn in, witnesses may be cross
examined, how to make an objection).
28. Explain the elements and the burden of proof.
29. Explain the kinds of evidence that can be presented and the
kinds of evidence that cannot be considered.
* Explain that you will make your decision based only on the
evidence presented.
" Encourage the parties to stipulate to uncontested facts and
the admission of as much of the documentary evidence as
possible.
30. Try to get all parties and counsel to agree to relax technical
rules of procedure and evidence so that the hearing can
proceed informally with an emphasis on both sides getting a
chance to tell their story.
HEARING
31. Ensure that the notice of hearing unambiguously describes in
a way a self-represented litigant can understand that a hearing
on the merits is being scheduled and the litigant should be
prepared with evidence and witnesses to present the case or
defense.
32. Allow non-attorneys to sit at counsel table with either party to
provide support but do not permit them to argue on behalf of
a party or to question witnesses.
33. Before starting, ask both parties whether they understand the
process and the procedures.
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34. Call breaks where necessary if a litigant is becoming
confused or tempers on either side are becoming frayed (or
your patience is running low).
35. Question any witness for clarification when the facts are
confused, undeveloped, or misleading.
* Explain at the beginning of a hearing that you will ask
questions if necessary to make sure you understand the
testimony and have the information you need to make a
decision.
* Ask the same type of questions of witnesses called by a
represented party if warranted.
* Take care that your language and tone when asking
questions does not indicate your attitude towards the
merits or the credibility of the witness.
36. Follow the rules of evidence that go to reliability but use
discretion and overrule objections on technical matters such
as establishing a foundation for introducing documents and
exhibits, qualifying an expert, and the form of questions or
testimony.
* If you relax a rule for a self-represented party, relax it for a
represented party as well.
* Require counsel to explain objections in detail.
* If counsel objects, ask if he or she is arguing that the
evidence is unreliable.
* Explain rulings on evidence.
37. If necessary to prevent obvious injustice, allow a brief recess
or adjourn for the day (or longer) to allow a self-represented
litigant (or even a represented litigant) to obtain additional
evidence or witnesses.
38. Do not allow counsel to bully or confuse self-represented
litigants or their witnesses.
THE DECISION
39. Announce and explain your decision immediately from the
bench with both parties present if possible unless the
volatility of the proceedings suggests that a written decision
would be preferable to prevent outbursts and attempts to re-
argue the case.
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40. If you decide to take a matter under advisement, inform the
parties that you wish to consider their evidence and
arguments and will issue a decision shortly.
If possible, announce a date by which a decision will be
reached.
41. Reach a decision promptly (required in all cases).
42. Issue an order in plain English explaining the decision,
addressing all material issues raised, resolving contested
issues of fact, and announcing conclusions of law.
43. If asked about reconsideration or appeal, refer the litigant to
resources for self-represented litigants on this topic.
44. If asked about enforcement of an order or collection of a
judgment, refer the litigant to any resources for self-
represented litigants on this topic.
